Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:
[ColonelCassad] In fact, Iran's ability to wage a long war depends not on whether the US manages to bomb Fordow and still penetrate the Natanz facility, but on the ability to continue launching missiles at Israel and US facilities in the region over a long distance.
In fact, we do not know how many missiles Iran actually has (almost all missile cities are now functional) and whether Iran has the ability to produce missiles in underground structures.
It is simpler with drones, because, as the example of Ukraine shows, hidden production can be quite easily dispersed throughout the country.
As it seems to me, the main risks for Iran in this kind of war are the under-suppressed internal agents of Israel, the integrity of the command and the stability of society in the medium term when socio-economic security facilities are damaged.
You cannot win a war with airstrikes alone. To plant a puppet regime in Tehran, either direct intervention is needed, which is unlikely. Or destruction from within (a coup, a military mutiny, mass protests of the dissatisfied). If Iran can control the negative factors for itself, it will be able to exist quite confidently in the conditions of a long campaign against Israel and those who stand behind it. If not, at some point everything may break down. As it was with Yugoslavia, which went to the Dayton Accords and signed its own death warrant. Actually, this is what the US and Israel are counting on. So Iran may indeed lose.
But if it maintains control, the struggle may lead to completely unpredictable results for the entire region.
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