In a world where the tragedy that is Iraq is usually discussed only in media sound bites and political slogans, it is especially gratifying to see an adult, intelligent, and insightful account of life inside Iraq by someone who lived there for nine months in the early days of the occupation in 2003 and 2004, and who saw the fundamental mistakes that would later plague the attempt to create a viable Iraqi government.
John Agresto, a career American academic and former college president who volunteered to go help create a better higher education system in Iraq, learned a lot about Iraqi society in general and about American attempts to create a better society there. His recently published book is titled "Mugged by Reality" and is subtitled: "The Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions."
What is refreshingly different about this book is that it does not take the Bush administration line, the Congressional Democrats' line or anybody else's line. Agresto is not out to prove some theory or push some pet scheme but to convey what he saw with his own eyes and discerned from his own experiences with both Iraqis and Americans in Iraq. He makes no claim to infallibility but in fact admits to being forced to change his mind by what he saw.
Initially a supporter of the invasion, he now says that he would not have been a supporter if he had known beforehand how the occupation would be mishandled and the results that followed. But he also recognizes that we cannot unring the bell and simply leave, for that would lead to even worse consequences, not only in Iraq but elsewhere, not only to others but to ourselves.
The worst mistake, in Agresto's view, was the failure to establish law and order in the wake of the military victory, before undertaking the grandiose project of attempting to create democracy in Iraq. From this fundamental mistake, many of the other tragedies followed. In the absence of law and order, there was widespread violence, looting, rape -- in short, the war of each against all that Hobbes warned about, centuries ago.
As for democracy, Agresto understands that the right to vote is no guarantee of freedom, toleration or respect for the rights of others. Without those prerequisites, democracy can mean tyranny at home and terrorism abroad.
Apparently the American civilian authorities in Iraq did not understand this or else they let that understanding be overridden by political considerations. By setting up a government based on warring factions, they made cooperation in the national interest a very unlikely prospect. Today, when more and more Iraqis are rejecting the outside terrorists whom the media keep calling "insurgents," and when our military is restoring more order than Iraq has seen in a while, the most intractable problem is the very government we set up.
General David Petraeus is mentioned only a couple of times, and briefly, in "Mugged by Reality." But those brief mentions seem to be revealing. Right after the success of military operations in Iraq, General Petraeus' 101st Airborne had control of the city of Mosul. According to Agresto, "he ran it in radically different ways than the rest of Iraq was run" -- and Mosul was "calm" in contrast to other parts of Iraq. Then, after control of Mosul was passed on to others, it "began to rival the worst sections of Baghdad for attacks on Coalition forces and violence against Iraqis."
One of the ways in which Petraeus ran Mosul differently from the way things were done in the rest of Iraq, according to Agresto, was not to get rid of existing public officials wholesale, despite their being members of the former ruling Baath Party.
Somebody has to run the basic institutions that make civilized life possible -- and you can't just get rid of those who know how to run those institutions before you have someone qualified to replace them. Apparently General Petraeus was pragmatic enough to understand that. We may, belatedly, have found a man and an approach that works.
#1
The worst mistake, in Agresto's view, was the failure to establish law and order in the wake of the military victory, before undertaking the grandiose project of attempting to create democracy in Iraq.
One of thoàse problems faced by the Americans after OIF was that the intense agitprop by islamists, Commies "pacifists" and Euros (specially Chirac) against teh war and this being for oiiiiiiiilllllll (don't forget also the Euro playing into AlQuaida's hands in propaganda terms) put them under intense pressure to transfer power to Irakis as soon as possible. In addition Allied forces depend for tehir suplies from several unstable Muslim countries whose governemnts could have been toppled if American occupation had been too heavy handed. Americans didn't have the latitude to delay for sevrel years the transfer to a new government like in post war Germany or to dictate Constitution like in Japan.
It is easy to say that the Americans shjould have done it differently when you ignore teh constraints.
Now you can notice I am putting the problems and tghe dead at the feet Of Chirac and of the pacifist movement.
#2
Also, we get here the classical mistake of all academics, imagining that on the average, people will behave in an orderly fashion with only a modicum of coercion. There was a lot of pent up demand for payback and mayhem in Saddamland, and hey what, demand got served...
Posted by: M. Murcek ||
09/18/2007 15:16 Comments ||
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#3
Additionally he falls into the
-A therefore B fallacy.
Just because A didn't work (well, good enough, at all; choose one) DOESN'T mean that B would have worked any better and may, in fact have worked worse!!
My opinion was for a different post-war strategy but there's no evidence that it would have been better.
The Shia were watching us to see if we were going to replace one group of Sunnis with another one. Had we kept the Baathists around we would have had 60% of Iraq mad at us instead of 20% that we actually did.
The bigger problem was that we were ignorent of Iraqi customs and language so we couldn't explain to them what we were trying to do. As we have become more familiar, our relations with the Iraqis is becoming much better.
The other "what if" involves the Sunnis. The deal they are taking now is basically the same one that Bremmer offered them in 2003. If they had taken the offer instead of Al Qaeda's they'd be alot better off today.
Al
Posted by: Frozen Al ||
09/18/2007 18:36 Comments ||
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#5
Frozen Al, My wife the Kindergarten teacher has always told me about the "teachable moment".
When we were raising our two boys she would point out that there were certain times that a lesson would sink in, and others when it would just bounce off.
You had to wait for the former and strike while the iron was hot (to mix metaphors). My job requires the same. Sometimes you just have to let the client fail before they will take your advice.
Iraq was the same way.
My idea was that we should have spent the early days running the central government for them; and teaching / turning over the local stuff (garbage collection like stuff) as soon as possible to the leaders at the local level. As they develop the skills to run government at that level build up regions or provinces and then go for the whole enchilada.
Of course, that assumes that the rest of the world / Demonrats gave us the needed time and that's one hell of an assumption.
The Palestinian Authority continues a long tradition of celebrating the 2001 World Trade Center terror attacks by publishing cartoons in its official daily that glorify Osama Bin Laden and the attacks, or mock the suffering of the U.S. This year's cartoon shows Bin Laden smiling while making the V for victory sign with two fingers in the shape of the burning Twin Towers. The PA daily that published the cartoon, Al Hayat Al Jadida, is owned by the PA and controlled by the office of Mahmoud Abbas. The only text on this cartoon is "Exclusive to Al Hayat Al Jadida," which means it was prepared specifically for the official Palestinian Authority daily. Rest at link.
Posted by: ed ||
09/18/2007 09:04 ||
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#1
Jeez, maybe we should send them even more money so they'll "like us"...
#3
I feel like nominating those others here who keep suggesting the use of high tonnage napalm against the Palestinians. There's limits and this is one of them. It is inhumane to idly sit by and allow the Palestinians to inflict so much suffering upon this world.
#4
Hey! Cut 'em some slack! It's the most 'fun' they can have in their Islamic Paradise.
The cartoons should be required reading at Congress and the UN. We're too civilized to revolt at revolting cartoons. Barely.
Posted by: Bobby ||
09/18/2007 16:39 Comments ||
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#5
On 9/11 there was a fistfight among UN Peacekeepers in Africa.
The Pakistani officers had just seen the towers fall and they were giving each other high fives. There were words with European peacekeepers who saw this and a fight broke out.
Posted by: john frum ||
09/18/2007 17:15 Comments ||
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. . . it's more than a little telling that the Israeli newspaper Haaretz chose, in the wake of an Israeli Air Force raid on Syria on Sept. 6 dubbed "Operation Orchard," to give front-page billing to an op-ed by John Bolton that appeared in this newspaper Aug. 31. While the article dealt mainly with the six-party talks with North Korea, Mr. Bolton also noted that "both Iran and Syria have long cooperated with North Korea on ballistic missile programs, and the prospect of cooperation on nuclear matters is not far-fetched." He went on to wonder whether Pyongyang was using its Middle Eastern allies as safe havens for its nuclear goods while it went through a U.N. inspections process.
How plausible is this scenario? The usual suspects in the nonproliferation crowd reject it as some kind of trumped-up neocon plot. Yet based on conversations with Israeli and U.S. sources, along with evidence both positive and negative (that is, what people aren't saying), it seems the likeliest suggested so far. That isn't to say, however, that plenty of gaps and question marks about the operation don't remain.
What's beyond question is that something big went down on Sept. 6. Israeli sources had been telling me for months that their air force was intensively war-gaming attack scenarios against Syria; I assumed this was in anticipation of a second round of fighting with Hezbollah. On the morning of the raid, Israeli combat brigades in the northern Golan Heights went on high alert, reinforced by elite Maglan commando units. Most telling has been Israel's blanket censorship of the story--unprecedented in the experience of even the most veteran Israeli reporters--which has also been extended to its ordinarily hypertalkative politicians. In a country of open secrets, this is, for once, a closed one. . . .
Go read the rest of it.
Posted by: Mike ||
09/18/2007 06:24 ||
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#1
It is more and more like "Team America" every day.
#2
But if Israel is contemplating an attack on Tehran's nuclear installations--and it is--it makes no sense to advertise the "Turkish corridor" as its likely avenue of attack.
Unless it is a diversion. Or a double-bluff. What makes no sense is assuming Iranians cannot look at a map and figure out how many ways to fly from Israel to Qom.
#3
WAFF.com [earlier/older article]> IRGC Cdr > Iran seeks DEFENSIVE AND BALLISTIC MISSLE SUPERIORITY agz Israel, besides also will engage any USA invasion in asymmetric warfare. Comments show Iran desires REGIONAL SUPERIORITY, and in and by itself casts doubt on Moud's = Iran's claims that its nucprog is only for energy.
September 16, 2007: The country is at war, or, more correctly, at wars. There are many fronts. Most of the fighting is being done by the Revolutionary Guards and the national police. The regular armed forces are kept in their barracks, as the government does not trust this conscript force, full of young men who are not very fond of the religious dictatorship running the country. The Revolutionary Guards, or at least the al Quds force (which specialize in supporting pro-Iranian terrorists in foreign countries) is having a hard time in Iraq. With the collapse of al Qaeda in Iraq (because the Sunni Arabs turned on them), U.S. troops are now concentrating on Iranian supported groups. Coalition commando forces are specifically looking to capture as many al Quds operatives as they can. As a result of this, Iran has been pulling its al Quds people out of Iraq. Those that have been captured so far have given up embarrassing and damaging information.
In northern Iran, the war against the Kurds is not going well. Before 2003, Iran was supporting pro-al Qaeda Kurdish groups by providing sanctuary inside Iran, as well as weapons and supplies. These Islamic radicals took control of some villages inside Iraq, but were destroyed by Kurdish militiamen and American Special Forces. Then Kurdish separatists groups began sneaking into Iran and recruiting Iranian Kurds who were willing to fight. That problem has grown over the past four years, to the point that there are several thousand Revolutionary Guard troops, including artillery and some armored vehicles, operating along the Iraq border. The Iranian artillery fires shells at Kurdish villages in Iraq, and Revolutionary Guard patrols often cross the border. But the Iranians know they cannot get too aggressive. The Kurdish militias can handle Revolutionary Guard patrols, and the Iranians have suffered dozens of casualties in these clashes over the Summer. The Iranians also know that if they put too many people into Iraq, they will have to deal with American smart bombs. While some Revolutionary Guard commanders say otherwise, most Iranian military leaders don't want to fight U.S. troops, especially not in largely Kurdish areas along the Iraq border. Most of those Kurds would welcome an American invasion, and the Iranian generals don't want to invite one. Even with that restraint, the fighting over the last few months has left over 200 dead, and many more wounded.
In the southwestern province of Khuzestan, police executed three Iranian Arabs, who were accused of terrorist bombings inside Iran. The Iranian Arabs are despised by ethnic Iranians (an Indo-Aryan group, related to Indians and Europeans), and the current generation of Iranian Arabs are fed up with the discrimination they suffer. Their fathers fought bravely for Iran when Iran invaded in the 1980s, and all the government gave in return was more abuse. There's more anger than organization and violence. British agents are widely believed to be helping to organize armed resistance, but there's no proof. Those rumors have been an Iranian staple for over a century. But there are a lot of unhappy Arabs in Khuzestan, and there is some violence.
In the southeast, there's a lot of violence, and several hundred casualties a year. But it's more crime-wave than war. It's all about drugs. Iran is a prime market, and transit route, for heroin and opium from Afghanistan. Pushtun tribes in Afghanistan, and Baluchi tribes in Iran, are getting rich from this trade, and the police, reinforced by Revolutionary Guard units, are fighting a losing battle against the well armed and motivated (by huge amounts of cash) smugglers.
Posted by: Steve White ||
09/18/2007 00:00 ||
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#1
Plausible. And I like it.
Posted by: Bobby ||
09/18/2007 7:25 Comments ||
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#2
Let's exacerbate this situation as much as possible.
#4
Not much of a problem for the mullahs as long as this administration refuses to fight back, preferably in Iran proper.
Posted by: ed ||
09/18/2007 7:46 Comments ||
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#5
Why do I need to add salt to an article written by Bill Roggio? I find his reports full of detailed facts and and pertinent information, upon which he will base his analysis.
clue me in, what's your evidence for sayibg this was written by Bill Riggio?
thanks in advance
Posted by: Red Dawg ||
09/18/2007 20:57 Comments ||
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#7
There is enough documented and anecdotal evidence around indicating that the Iranian armed forces are trying to stay apolitical.
In the mid-90s, senior officers in the army, air force (and the usually loyal Islamic Revolutionary Guard) reportedly stated that they would no longer order their troops into battle to quell civil disorder. The Iranian navy in particular is also pretty much a naval militia/security guard force at this point. Not exactly an indicator of trust.
As for the anecdotal... I'll say it's from a series of limited personal experiences (mostly with the Iranian navy).
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