#2
A bit dated but still valid. The average French para or ranker, yes, very pro-US. Above the rank of Major, well, not so very much I'm afraid. Like everything else, there are exceptions. If they are from the Alsace or Normandy you're home free.
#5
THanks TW. I can certify that the translation is faithful but be careful because there is a bracketed comment inserted in the translation ansd a long final comment who IMHO is not made clear enough that is is not partn of the French soldier's text. The French text ends with "and to always continue hearing them say that we are all the same band of brothers".
#6
Both the final quote and the endquote are from John Ringo.
Posted by: DanNY ||
09/29/2011 11:30 Comments ||
Top||
#7
I understand that John Ringo moved around a lot growing up, I wouldn't be surprised to find out that French is among the languages he knows in passing.
Posted by: Redneck Jim ||
09/29/2011 14:42 Comments ||
Top||
#2
Obama failed to close Guantanamo Bay as promised. He continued warrantless surveillance and military tribunals that denied defendants basic rights.
They never stop making stuff up do they?/rhet question
What basic rights? The stuff on the books, Geneva and Hague Conventions, specifically address who's entitled and who is not entitled to 'protection'. No matter how many times you try to ignore the reality, illegal combatants don't have rights under existing processes.
As far as surveillance, as long as its not employed in a civil court of law, it is simply inadmissible for consideration. Data transiting servers in the US with origination and destination in foreign countries isn't a problem. Doesn't mean they can't gather intel for other actions sanctioned under the law.
#3
Now the president has begun campaigning for a second term. He will again be selling himself more than his policies, but he is likely to find many civil libertarians who simply are not buying.
A rather telling summation I'd say. Writer must have been late for a dinner engagment.
[Dawn] ADM Mike Mullen, the outgoing chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, spoke unusually bluntly about Pakistain's military and intelligence services during his last appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Sept 22.
He said: "The fact remains that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network operate from Pakistain with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistain are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers.
For example, we believe the Haqqani network -- which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pak government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistain's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency -- is responsible for the Sept 13 attacks against the US embassy in Kabul.
"There is ample evidence confirming that the Haqqanis were behind the June 28 attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and the Sept 10 truck kaboom that killed five Afghans and injured another 96 individuals, 77 of whom were US soldiers. History teaches us that it is difficult to defeat an insurgency when fighters enjoy a sanctuary outside national boundaries, and we are seeing this again today.
"The Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network are hampering efforts to improve security in Afghanistan, spoiling possibilities for broader reconciliation, and frustrating US-Pakistain relations. The actions by the Pak government to support them -- actively and passively -- represent a growing problem that is undermining US interests and may violate international norms, potentially warranting sanction. In supporting these groups, the government of Pakistain, particularly the Pak Army, continues to jeopardise Pakistain's opportunity to be a respected and prosperous nation with genuine regional and international influence."
When Mullen, the foremost US defender of maintaining sound working ties with Pakistain's military, expresses this much exasperation, those who seek to retain decent bilateral relations are in trouble. Ties have become extremely tenuous and are likely to deteriorate further.
By publicly confirming and not qualifying reality, Mullen has changed the rules of the game, while laying the predicate for actions that will further inflame anti-US sentiment within Pakistain by embarrassing Pakistain's military hierarchy. The prosecution of the US military campaign in Afghanistan will then become much harder, and whatever residual support Pakistain provides to the US on other issues will be placed at risk.
The B.O. regime has apparently concluded that its earlier mix of carrots and sticks cannot influence Rawalpindi's unfortunate choices. Both countries are well past the stage of doing favours for each other; cooperation is limited to common interests. After 9/11, the Bush administration issued an ultimatum for Pakistain's military establishment to cut ties with the Taliban and help the US crush Al Qaeda.
Pakistain's military was paid for its support and its self-interested sacrifices, but each party became disillusioned with this compact. Rawalpindi's contributions in the 'war on terror' are highly selective, and the benefits provided by Washington have come with insults to Pak illusory sovereignty and contention over the Taliban's role in Afghanistan. Disputes now loom larger than common interests.
In 2009, there was talk of moving beyond this transactional relationship with the passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, but these hopes have been unfulfilled. Not much aid has made it through the pipeline because of bureaucratic obstacles and concerns over corruption. Differences in US and Pak policies have also grown as Washington's relations with New Delhi have improved. Only Pakistain opposes the start of negotiations to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Rawalpindi has doubled down on very unwise decisions about Afghanistan and India. Inputs from Pakistain's president, prime minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs on these matters are imperceptible, so ritualistic and assorted denials, vows and pledges only serve to further diminish those who speak what they do not know or cannot change.
Both Washington and Rawalpindi are quite capable of repeating past mistakes and making matters worse. Pakistain's woes are mostly self-inflicted, but Washington has repeatedly bet against Pakistain's future by focusing on military ties. Even so, Pakistain's military leaders continue to budget substantial sums for nuclear weapons while resisting improved relations with India, a prerequisite if Pakistain is to become a normal nation.
Rawalpindi's Afghan policy, which seems to be repeating the mistakes of the 1990s, may be based on the assumption that the Pentagon and the US intelligence community will continue to prevent another divorce -- but both of these stores are now under new management.
Alternatively, the boldness of recent strikes in Afghanistan by Rawalpindi's proxies may reflect the conclusion that the relationship has been broken beyond repair. Either way, Pakistain's security establishment is acting in a way that suggests that its influence within Afghanistan matters more than its relations with the US.
Adm Mullen advised his listeners on Capitol Hill not to disengage from Pakistain, but rather to "reframe" the relationship to buttress civil authority and to expect far less from military leaders in Pakistain. This was the sentiment behind Kerry-Lugar-Berman -- one well worth pursuing, but which has not yet had much success.
Unless Rawalpindi changes course, Pakistain may find itself reframed from a major non-NATO ...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A single organization with differing goals, equipment, language, doctrine, and organization.... ally to a state sponsor of terrorism. Then the architects of policies that have diminished Pakistain's security and international standing will again blame the US for exiting the relationship after misusing it.
Posted by: Fred ||
09/29/2011 00:00 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[4 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Pakistan
#1
History teaches us that it is difficult to defeat an insurgency when fighters enjoy a sanctuary outside national boundaries, and we are seeing this again today.
And for the past ten years or so in Pakistan, plus or minus.
#2
I was confused that the article kept referring to Rawalpindi instead of Islamabad, the capitol of Land of the
Pure. But it turns out Rawalpindi is where the army is headquartered, which makes perfect sense.
[Dawn] RELATIONS between the US and Pakistain, which have been particularly fraught for much of this year, took an unprecedented dive last week following Adm Mike Mullen's congressional testimony implicating the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate in the Haqqani network's dramatic and deadly breach of security in what is deemed to be the safest part of Kabul.
The siege was a thorough embarrassment for the US, challenging the idea that conditions in Afghanistan are steadily improving. It is instructive to recall that the Mujahideen never managed anything quite so dramatic during the Soviet occupation of the country -- the era when Charlie Wilson, the Democratic congressman who made American support for the jihad his personal mission, described Jalaluddin Haqqani as "goodness personified".
Some of the inheritors of Wilson's trigger-happy mentality are now willing to countenance an invasion of North Wazoo to eradicate the Haqqanis.
Meanwhile, ...back at the game, the Babe was wondering why the baseball kept getting bigger and bigger. Finally it hit him... Pakistain, which has for years resisted American pressure to mount a military assault on North Waziristan, has busily been devoting its energies to denying the charge of complicity and decrying the "blame game".
However, some people are alive only because it's illegal to kill them... Mullen, the retiring chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and a frequent visitor to Pakistain, could not possibly have been unaware of the gravity of his charge. It would have been hugely irresponsible to base it on hearsay. Reports suggest that the evidence consists of intercepted communications between the attackers and ISI representatives.
The Pak denials have been equally vehement, but it's not hard to discern a crucial difference of tone between statements from the civilian establishment and the military authorities. Of particular interest is Gen Ashfaq Kayani ... four star general, current Chief of Army Staff of the Mighty Pak Army. Kayani is the former Director General of ISI... 's comment that the Americans are well aware of exactly which countries maintain contacts with the Haqqanis, implying that Pakistain isn't the only one.
It's no doubt worth noting that a couple of years ago the US declined to formally declare the Haqqani network a foreign terrorist organization, and there have been suggestions that the US would not be entirely averse to dealing with the Haqqanis under certain circumstances.
What's more, claims by the Pak military that the group now operates mostly out of eastern Afghanistan have lately been corroborated by Jalaluddin's son Sirajuddin Haqqani, who recently told Rooters: "Gone are the days when we were hiding in the mountains along the Pakistain-Afghanistan border. Now we consider ourselves more secure in Afghanistan...."
According to a report in The New York Times ...which still proudly displays Walter Duranty's Pulitzer prize... last week, "Over the past five years, with relatively few American troops operating in eastern Afghanistan, the Haqqanis have run what is in effect a protection racket for construction firms -- meaning that American taxpayers are helping to finance the enemy network."
The report also speaks of a mini-state in Miramshah "with courts, tax offices and radical madressah schools producing a ready supply of fighters", as well as real estate and car sales operations in Pakistain and smuggling and extortion activities.
"But the group is not just a two-bit mafia," the NYT claims. "It is an organised mafia using high-profile terrorist attacks on hotels, embassies and other targets to advance its agenda to become a power broker in a future political settlement. And, sometimes, the agenda of its patrons ... the ISI."
The connection has long been alleged and never convincingly denied, although its exact nature remains speculative, with suggestions that it's much murkier than a direct line of command.
American angst at evidence of direct contacts during the Sept 13-14 attack, following suspicion of collaboration during previous terrorist assaults on the InterContinental Hotel last June and on the Indian embassy in Kabul three years ago, is unsurprising. Options for an effective response, however, are far less clear. Suspension of aid would send a message but may well provoke an undesirable reaction. Intensified drone strikes, too, are likely to be counterproductive.
Former CIA field officer Robert Baer, who has a reputation for being bluntly realistic, writes in Time magazine that an attempt by the US "to destroy the Haqqani base in North Waziristan by invading Pakistain ... would require more troops than we currently have in Afghanistan" and "would obviously destroy whatever relations we still have with Pakistain, with profoundly dangerous consequences in Afghanistan and beyond".
According to Baer, the US needs to dispense with the notion "that the ISI is somehow a rogue organization outside of [the Pak military establishment's] chain of command", and that the Americans have erred in not taking into account Pakistain's strategic interests.
"Accepting Pakistain's post-conflict agenda and backing off on the Haqqanis at [Hamid] Karzai's expense is too bitter a pill for Washington to swallow in an election year, so we'll muddle through for another year," he concludes. "But when the US finally leaves, don't be surprised to see the Haqqanis in Kabul."
That's not a terribly optimistic assessment, but Baer is by no means the only American intelligence analyst to suggest that Pakistain's actions are essentially motivated by security considerations vis-à-vis India. That may not be too much of an exaggeration, although the internal consequences of cooperating with snuffies should by now be all too clear.
Ultimately, the only way out of this destructive mindset lies in abandoning all forms of jihad and normalising relations with India. That would, of course, require a concerted effort from both sides. The burdens of the past -- not least the recent past -- render it hard but not impossible.It is not hard to understand why the Pakistain Army would rather not be seen, internally or externally, as a proxy force for the US. Pakistain stands to benefit enormously, however, if it could begin to diminish the India-fixated underpinnings of its raison d'être.
Unfortunately, any such development is extremely unlikely to occur before the so-called endgame in Afghanistan plays out. Any meaningful new beginning for the region, however, cannot be restricted to that benighted nation.
Posted by: Fred ||
09/29/2011 00:00 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[2 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Pakistan
#1
Baer nails it squarely.
Cough, cough..... the er, uh, UNCLAS (yes anyone can read it)
OPEN SOURCE LINK, special attention line four plesse. Yes, that would be line four.
#2
Mullen, the retiring chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and a frequent visitor to Pakistain, could not possibly have been unaware of the gravity of his charge.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
Wazoo
ccording to a report in The 
