After a brazen Taliban attack killed nine U.S. soldiers in a remote outpost in Afghanistan on July 13, Sens. McCain and Obama seemed to start a competition over who would more rapidly surge U.S. military forces to Afghanistan. Sen. Obama's trip to Afghanistan and Iraq has further focused attention on the vast disparity in U.S. resources going to the two wars. Americans should welcome the recognition by both presidential contenders that Afghanistan is central to U.S. and international security. But we should remain wary of promises to apply an Iraq-style surge to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is even more complex than Iraq, and given complicating factors such as the presence of al-Qaida senior leadership, global narco-trafficking, and Pakistani nuclear weapons, the stakes in Afghanistan are higher. The challenge in Afghanistan differs from that in Iraq in several critical ways that raise questions about what a military surge alone can accomplish.
First, porous borders are a much bigger problem in Afghanistan. While Iraqi and coalition forces face extremist infiltration from Iran and Syria, Afghan, U.S. and NATO forces face a more daunting 1,640-mile ungoverned border with Pakistan. This line is recognized and sparsely defended by government forces but ignored by Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. The result is a battlefield where the enemy has ready sanctuary from which to stage attacks. How will additional U.S. forces fare any better without either a new partnership with Pakistan on border security or rules that allow counterinsurgency efforts reach across the border into Pakistan?
Second, having a real coalition in Afghanistan brings real complications. In contrast to being relatively alone and in charge of the mission in Iraq, in Afghanistan the U.S. is both blessed and cursed by the support of over 40 partner countries and countless NGOs, all with their own strategies. How can a change in American military strategy overcome the command split between NATO and the United States and help coordinate dozens of independent actors?
Third, the extremists in Afghanistan have a different resource base: heroin. Oil fuels some insurgent capabilities in Iraq, but it cannot be compared to the challenge of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Over 90 percent of the world's heroin now originates in the most lawless Afghan regions, funding the recruitment, training, and deployment of insurgents and terrorists. But the poppy also supports local economies for average Afghans, putting the coalition in a quandary: tolerate poppy and fund the Taliban or eradicate poppy and drive poor farmers into extremists' arms. How can a military surge help Afghanistan find an effective solution for this poppy paradox?
Finally, although Iraq is ailing and damaged, it has modern infrastructure and a history of central control that is alien to the Afghan and Pakistani tribal areas in which the current conflict is concentrated. How would more U.S. forces helping to extend central government control in Afghanistan be more than a band aid?
None of these questions are answered, but it is clear that a surge in U.S. military capabilities can only be effective if complemented by several other steps. The most important are increased civilian reconstruction capabilities and well-funded, long-term training and mentoring of the Afghan military and police. These are the kind of measures that the U.S. could not muster for the surge in Iraq, and yet they are far more important in Afghanistan where the existing systems are so much weaker.
Many of the steps taken under the leadership of Gen. Petraeus in Iraq do have relevance for Afghanistan. Chief among these would be a focus on population security that involves U.S., NATO and Afghan soldiers and civilians living in district centers and villages with the people under threat from the Taliban and al-Qaida. Second is a willingness to engage with the very tribes and clans that may have been shooting at allied forces the previous day. The coalition will continue to find local allies if our commitment is to be seen as credible and enduring.
Afghanistan is in trouble but far from lost. Less than one-third of the country is really unstable and only about 10 percent of Afghan districts are under significant Taliban sway. But a surge of all types of effort -- military and civilian -- is needed to turn the tide. The mini-surge of 3,000 marines into the south and east of the country will soon draw to close after some success clearing insurgents, but the U.S. and its allies have little ability to hold and build those areas without capable Afghan security forces and Afghan and international civilians.
U.S. forces should only surge into Afghanistan with a workable and comprehensive strategy and the right civilian counterparts. The renewal of interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan offers a real opportunity. The presidential candidates -- or indeed President Bush in his remaining months -- should craft a strategy that ensures money and personnel for a civilian and military surge tailored to Afghanistan.
Vikram Singh is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security and former Pentagon official.
#2
"tolerate poppy and fund the Taliban or eradicate poppy and drive poor farmers into extremists' arms. How can a military surge help Afghanistan find an effective solution for this poppy paradox?"
Easy. Eradicate poppies with defoliants, pay off the willing farmers, and use increased troop levels to kill the ones that join the taliban and rebel (and burn their farms and bulldoze their houses when we kill them in combat against the troops there).
Dead rebels don't do well farming poppies, other than as fertilizer.
#3
Make sure the farmers have something else to grow that is profitable and they are protected from the drug lords while doing it. Then we have a workable chance of pulling off a nice nation building exercise. Otherwise we are spinning our wheels.
#4
I more or less agree. Afghanistan should be left to Afghans. Let Pashtun fight Pashtun while we make sure the other tribes and the border are secure and the poppy fields are destroyed.
#5
Americans should welcome the recognition by both presidential contenders that Afghanistan is central to U.S. and international security.
Let's examine this assumption. In exactly what way is Afghanistan central to US security? I'll be damned if I can think of one. It is difficult to think of a more godforsaken place on earth so bereft of economic, cultural, military, or political power.
We've kicked out the Taliban. We've demonstrated to some outstanding natural warriors what professionally trained warriors can do. We should tell them that if they entertain the likes of the Taliban and al Qaeda again, we'll be back. But not as nicely. And then leave.
#6
Sens. McCain and Obama seemed to start a competition over who would more rapidly surge U.S. military forces to Afghanistan.
The real difference is that McCain will listen to the Generals and take their advice, Obama will probably try to run the war himself since he is soooo smart. That's the real danger, not the taliwhackers, but Obama.
#7
In exactly what way is Afghanistan central to US security?
Because it is crucial to win the propaganda war and you would handle a big victory to jihadis if we retreat from Afganistan. Say a Gettisburg in the WOT.
Because for reaspons I have exposed several times it is crucialm to make Pakistan implode and the best instrument for this Pakistani Pashtuns (who have been radicalized by the Punjabis) wanting to leave Pakistan and return to their real country: Afganistan.
#9
The difference between leaving and retreating is negligible to the Jihadist propaganda machine. That is something we need to consider.
Having said that, Pashtun's fight with everyone. We need to find a way to fight Pashtun's that support Al Queda and not Pashtun's that just want to kill their neighbors, or the government, or whomever.
#10
Our major weakness in the XOT is that people think that time plays for the jiahadis, that one day we will tire and that it will eb American helicopters over the roof of American embassy in Kabul. With those left behind being sadistically murdered like jihados have ever done. That is why people far to collabirate with Amdericans and that jihadis get new recruits.
Becauise Jihad nurtures itself of successes. And their "victory" against teh Soviet Union (never mind that 90% of the work was done by Massoud and
Ismael Khan who were not Taliban) was seen as amjor success for jihad. One, so big that theu thought they could tackle the other superpower. Give tham a victoty in Afghanistan and they will think they can tackle not only America but the world.
#11
Our major weakness is those on our side who are tooting for the enemy.
Maybe instead of the relevant 19th century reference I should give the less relevant 20th century reference of no Dien Bien Phu. That's a defeat, not leaving.
#12
A leftist told me a few months ago that Americans had had to run out of Vietnam. If americans leave and/or if the governement left behind is ousted (eg Afghanistan where it was Dostom, switching sides who tumbled the pro-Soviet government) jihadis will spin it as a victory. And it will do wonders for their recruitment and for the emergence of new bin Ladens.
Also, we would have a lot more people on
our side, including informants if everyone didn't remember the helicopters in American mebassy in Saigon.
#13
A surge will pump billions more into the Pakistan's economy who will then divert 10% to raise a new crop of jihadis.
Posted by: ed ||
07/28/2008 18:46 Comments ||
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#14
The "Strongman" policy wherein US supported repressive regimes as long as they weren't too klepto and served US interests, was terminated by the Carter administration. Democracy isn't the solution in Central Asia. Afghan electors don't vote on merit; their votes are directed by War Lords and Clerics. In that context, Strongman rule would be better for them and the US. There is some evidence that the Northern Alliance wanted to execute those captured Taliban that the Tajiks, Russians, Uzbeks, and Americans wouldn't pay for. Scorched earth tactis - however brutal - worked in the North; they could be tried in the south.
Ironically, Waziri and Pashto terrorists who never heard of a cell phone prior to NATO's action in Afghanistan, now use these to advance terror. Pakistan has a revenue redistribution scheme, wherein the province's get fixed percentages of federal funds, including US aid. Paradoxically, US money is being used to murder American soldiers. Combine that with the Pashto Heroin monopoly, and a dangerous prosperity is flourishing in areas that should look like the Moon. Senator McCain took the high road in the Schmidt Commission process, into US military regulation in the Afghanistan field. He needs to campaign for rationalization of the entire scope of strategies and tactics in that GWOT front. The GOP has to offer something other than the status quo. The 9% bump that Obama gathered after his voyage of ignorance, manifests public interest in workable change. The Afghan status quo is not working; that status quo cannot be made to work.
Until the United States develops an adequate substitute for oil, we are stuck in the Middle East protecting the free flow of affordable fossil fuel that not only fills American SUVs but also ensures the stability of global markets. Pollack makes a good case that were it not for our presence in the Gulf, we would not be such a valuable target on the jihadist hit list, and were we to leave tomorrow, the threat to the United States from Arab terror outfits would largely subside.
Since we are not leaving, we need to repair the region with a broad program of economic and political reform, different from the Bush administration's quick-fix obsession with elections that merely lent democratic legitimacy to Islamist groups in the Palestinian Authority, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt. Pollack argues that a process of real liberal reform will take decades, if not longer.
Islamism, which Pollack is at pains to distinguish from Islam, is a vital force in the region precisely because it represents the progressive and rational current of Islam that sought to reconcile a society marked by fatalism and backwardness with "the forces of modernity" embodied by the West.
That trend, starting with 19th-century Muslim reformers Jamal al-din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu, gave rise to the Islamist movement, from the Muslim Brotherhood all the way down to the most notoriously violent organizations in the region like Hamas and al-Qaida. For Pollack, as for many U.S. policymakers, a key question is whether Islamists should be allowed to participate in the democratic process and, if so, which ones should qualify. However, the Islamists, both moderate and extreme, are already a part of Middle Eastern political culture, whether we like it or not. The problem is with our intellectual framework: By focusing on how to jump-start the "democratic process," we have failed to recognize what the region really looks like.
That is to say, Middle Eastern regimes are not the source of the region's problems. As the decapitation of Saddam Hussein's regime showed, the psychopaths, princes, and presidents for life who rule Arab states are merely the hothouse flowers of a poisonous political culture. "The States are as the men are," Plato writes in The Republic. "They grow out of human characters." The failure to respect this basic and ancient political principle marks by far the greatest intellectual error of neocon Middle East policy and thus of the entire liberal intelligentsia from which it arises. As we saw with Hezbollah's orgiastic celebrations for released child-murderer Samir Kuntar, the problem with the Arab world is Arab societies themselves.
The Iraq war should have cured us of any illusions about the Middle East, but the administration's incoherence let us put many of the region's problems on Bush's tab. American opinion will be easier on the next president and harder on the Middle East itself as we come to distinguish between our problems, mistakes, and limitations and those of the Arabs. The paradox is that one of our sharpest limitations is that we believe democracy is a universal cure-all, good for all people at all times, when that is almost certainly not the case. However, as Pollack argues, democratic reform seems to be the only thing that will save the Middle East from consuming itself in violence, for the region can get worse than it is now, much worse.
This is going to end one of two ways. Either these guys are going to act up too much once too often and we have to whack them really good or we develop alternatives (nukes and coal)and they become irrelevant. Either way it will end badly for them.
#1
Most Muslims believe that democracy usurps power from their deity. Their clerics only play the voter card when they believe it can lead to victory.
As for the so called 19th "reformers," they emulated the Romantic movement's internationalism, so as to advance the Islamist agenda. Abdu later became Mufti Sahib of al-Azhar University in Cairo. He, like Afghani, were reactionaries.
Currently, Muslims promote the "islamization of knowledge," in the same way that Marxists promoted the "socialization" of same. They are not an integral element where they reside in the West; they are inherently subversive.
Islam and modern health/sanitation. Take either away and the problem becomes self limiting.
Posted by: ed ||
07/28/2008 18:57 Comments ||
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#3
The paradox is that one of our sharpest limitations is that we believe democracy is a universal cure-all, good for all people at all times, when that is almost certainly not the case. However, as Pollack argues, democratic reform seems to be the only thing that will save the Middle East from consuming itself in violence, for the region can get worse than it is now, much worse.
The last two sentences of the essay and Nimble Spemble's final comment sum up the situation nicely, although I disagree that there remains the alternative of starving the Middle East into submission; the region has too much money socked away in other investments, and the people are now accustomed to the idea of moving to greener pastures such as Europe and North America, where some of them will continue to fight their jihad regardless of conditions back home.
However, being that we are civilized men and women, we had to give Muslim Asia (not merely the Arab World) -- as represented by the two countries where we exerted any control, Iraq and Afghanistan -- a chance to prove themselves capable of evolving into acceptable neighbors before eradicating them as functionally rabid dogs too dangerous to be allowed to live in the same universe as the rest of us. The experiment has not yet run its course, I believe, but it is interesting to see others beginning to conclude that it has.
#4
The problem was that there was never an Islamist success in modern times until Jimmy Carter handed them one by abandoning Iran. And as soon as Carter did that, Russia invaded neighboring Afghanistan setting the stage for the second Islamist success. And then the Iranian Islamists created the third Islamist success with Hezbollah in Lebanon. I have seen the enemy ... and it is us.
Drug production has skyrocketed since the US-led invasion that ousted the Taliban. I don't like posting al-Jazeera material, but this article reveals fallout of US complaints against Karzai's brazen harborage of fellow Pashto drug gangsters, notwithstanding their symbiotic relationship with the Taliban.
In 2007, nearly 200,000 hectares of land in Afghanistan was used to cultivate poppy - more than double the area in 2003 – and the country produced 93 per cent of the world's supply of opium, the raw material of heroin.
Karzai says his government is succeeding in the war on drugs and has repeatedly promised his US backers that he is committed to rooting out endemic corruption and fighting the drug trade.
His counter-narcotics ministry says 20 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces will be poppy-free this year, compared to 13 provinces in 2007. UN statistics confirm that eradication is progressing in non-Karzai sections of Afghanistan.
But in the south, cultivation remains rampant.
I would like to see Omar Khadr get his day in court, and justice be finally served, for the widow and children of the man he's accused of murdering as well as for Khadr himself. It bears noting that had it not been for legal wrangling initiated by Mr. Khadr's counsel, he would likely have been tried and the matter dispensed with before now. Unfortunately, Khadr's lawyers, enthusiastically abetted by most of Canada's lefty media, have done their damnedest to turn the Khadr affair into a matter of politics rather than justice, with monotonous references to him as a "child soldier," rote allegations of "torture (torture lite?)," and the calculatedly inflammatory release of heavily-edited video excerpts from CSIS interviews with Khadr at Guantanamo Bay where he's been imprisoned for six years.
If you've been vacationing incognito on the dark side of the moon, Toronto-born Khadr, now aged 21, was shot and captured on July 27, 2002, at the age of 15 by U.S. forces at Ayub Kheyl, Afghanistan, after an engagement with Taliban/al Qaeda insurgents, and is alleged to have killed U.S. Army medic Sgt. Christopher Speer with a grenade. Omar's father, Ahmad, a lieutenant and financier of Osama bin Laden, moved his family from Toronto to Pakistan in the mid 1990s to join the anti-Western jihad, and was killed by security forces in 2003.
According to a 2002 report by the Boston Globe's Colin Nickerson, U.S. troops, patrolling with Pashtun militia encountered a group of armed insurgents. After a 45 minute negotiation, the insurgents suddenly opened fire and chucked grenades, killing two militiamen, and blinding U.S. Sergeant Layne Morris in one eye. The Americans radioed for close air support, initiating a four hour bombardment of the insurgents' position with rockets, bombs, and cannon fire. When that finished, a ground party cautiously advanced. Sergeant Speer, a medic who reportedly had recently risked his life to rescue two injured Afghan children from a minefield, entered the bombed-out enemy compound seeking wounded, at which point a lone survivor of the air attack, Omar Khadr, allegedly crawled out of the rubble with pistol in hand and lobbed a grenade, wounding Sgt. Speer, who died 11 days later. American soldiers returned fire, wounding Omar twice in the chest. He fared better than Sgt. Speer, and was shipped to Guantanamo upon recovery from his wounds.
More recently, an alternate version of events based on a classified document quoting an unidentified soldier has been floated by Khadr's advocates contending the grenade that killed Sgt. Speer was thrown during the heat of battle, that a second jihadi was still alive when it was thrown, and that Khadr was already wounded, making the second militant (who later died) a more likely culprit.
That sort of controversy needs sorting out at trial, but I have problems with the revisionist version, which seems implausible or self-contradictory on several counts. Sgt. Morris, who was actually there, insists Mr. Khadr must have thrown the grenade because he was the only one left alive in the compound, telling the National Post last week: "my lasting image of Omar is of him crouched in the rubble waiting for U.S. troops to get close enough so he could take one of them out, and he did that successfully. . ." Sgt. Morris told CBC Radio's The Current that suggestion of a second survivor was "a surprise. . . . I talked to almost everybody who was in that compound or there that day and none of them mentioned that there was actually two guys alive in there."
I'm inclined to believe Sgt. Morris's version, and presumably he'll testify at the trial, which thankfully will be in a U.S. military court, because if Khadr had, for argument's sake, been returned to Canada, tried and convicted of the Speer murder, as a "young offender" he would no doubt already be out of jail. At least if he's found guilty in the U.S., he'll serve hard time without anonymity, rather than being returned to Canada for likely immediate parole -- perhaps even being awarded "compensation."
As for Khadr's being Canadian, whatever the facts about the grenade murder, he was in Afghanistan fighting the ISAF coalition of which Canada is part. There's a name for people who take up arms against their country: "traitor." It is legally defined as a Canadian citizen who "assists an enemy at war with Canada, or any armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in hostilities, whether or not a state of war exists between Canada and the country whose forces they are."
If Khadr ever makes it back to Canada, it would be appropriate to immediately charge him with treason. However, Canadian legal experts express doubt that he would be charged with anything at all, which is why he's exactly where he should be.
#1
The opening line of this piece sounds sort of like Judge Roy Bean: "Were gonna give this man a fair trial, then we're gonna take him out and hang him..." I like that.
Posted by: M. Murcek ||
07/28/2008 9:41 Comments ||
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#2
If we had followed the Geneva Convention, this kid would have been executed as an illegal combatant six years ago.
Posted by: Rambler in California ||
07/28/2008 19:09 Comments ||
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PakistanÂ’s new civilian prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, is in Washington this week for what we are sure will be a difficult set of meetings.
Mr. GilaniÂ’s constituents deeply resent the United States for propping up and enabling their former dictator, Pervez Musharraf. President Bush, who directed that enabling, must have his own serious doubts about Mr. GilaniÂ’s willingness to fight Taliban and Qaeda forces that are using Pakistan as a safe haven.
That is why Mr. Bush needs to use this visit to recast relations — making clear that he is committed to strengthening both Pakistan’s democracy and its ability to fight extremism. That will require a lot more economic assistance and more carefully monitored military aid.
For their part, Pakistan’s civilian leaders must provide more honest and effective governance. They must tell their voters that extremism also threatens Pakistan — and that this is not just America’s fight.
The government also needs to find new ways of asserting its authority in the tribal areas, by providing better social services, promoting economic development and working more closely with tribal leaders. And it must send more elite troops trained in counterinsurgency to take on Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Both sides would be better able to achieve these goals if Congress approved legislation introduced this month by Senator Joseph Biden and Senator Richard Lugar that provides for substantial long-term increases in economic assistance to Pakistan and tighter monitoring of American military assistance. The White House needs to give this bipartisan initiative its strong support.
The imbalance it seeks to remedy between lavish but misdirected military aid and miserly economic assistance was highlighted in the recent Congressional skirmish over who would pay for modernizing PakistanÂ’s jet fighters.
The modernized F-16 is a high-technology plane, mainly intended to deter India, and is poorly suited to counterinsurgency operations along the Afghan border. The original plan was for Pakistan to pay the $230 million a year. But now the White House and Mr. Gilani want Congress to pick up the tab.
Mr. Gilani is eager to keep the Pakistani military happy — and the new army commander, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, is a professional who has supported the transition to civilian government. If Washington pays, it would also, in theory, free up those millions for badly needed social spending.
If spent wisely, that money could go far. A program to control and prevent hepatitis B infections would cost roughly $100 million. A public-health laboratory network could be set up for $30 million.
Under present aid formulas, Washington can pay for the F-16 upgrades only by shifting funds from equipment better suited for fighting the Taliban. Pakistan needs more such equipment — not less — including Cobra helicopters and night-vision goggles.
Pakistan should not be modernizing the F-16Â’s at all, but that deal was made long ago. Congress should hold its nose and approve this yearÂ’s F-16 money, plus additional emergency funds for the helicopters and goggles. Then it should quickly enact the Biden-Lugar legislation.
That way, Pakistan will have reliable funding for future social programs and be able to focus American military aid on counterterrorism. It is an imperfect solution but could be the start of a better relationship — one that promotes democracy and the fight against Al Qaeda.
Posted by: john frum ||
07/28/2008 17:34 ||
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#1
Pakistan should not be modernizing the F-16's at all, but that deal was made long ago. Congress should hold its nose and approve this year's F-16 money, plus additional emergency funds for the helicopters and goggles.
Those NVG goggles will end up on the LOC with troops facing India. Some might even be given to jihadi infiltrators.
The helicopters will join the armored corps facing the Indian Punjab.
Like the F-16s, they will never see the NWFP/FATA.
Posted by: john frum ||
07/28/2008 17:39 Comments ||
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#2
That's not entirely true. The Sniper equipped F-16s will be used to recon bases on the Afghan side.
Posted by: ed ||
07/28/2008 18:53 Comments ||
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With the Indian Mujahideen claiming responsibility for the Ahmedabad blasts - its third "success" after the UP court blasts and the Jaipur mayhem - questions are being asked about its pedigree.
Sleuths are wondering whether it is the proscribed Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) or a loose coalition of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, masquerading under a new name. "There is a strong possibility that it could be SIMI," said B Raman, a former additional secretary with RAW.
The three strikes claimed by IM reveal the same objective and modus operandi as that of SIMI, he added. Raman, however, doesn't rule out the existence of a homegrown outfit which had so far managed to skip the radar of the intelligence agencies.
"There may be some elements that did not come to notice in the past," he said.
Intelligence officials also don't discount the possibility of Al-Umma, a TN-based outfit that was behind the 1998 Coimbatore blasts, and SIMI forming a pool of dedicated, homegrown terrorists. Al-Umma, also known to have a presence in Bangalore, shares the ideology of SIMI.
The serial blasts in UP courts raised suspicion that IM was nothing but a loose coalition of LeT and JeM that had intimidated the legal fraternity for the lawyers' unwillingness to represent terror suspects.
However, when serial blasts rocked Jaipur, the sheer scale of the operation hinted at the involvement of local elements that could only be provided by radical outfits like SIMI which has a presence in many states, including Rajasthan.
The outfit behind the Ahmedabad blasts could be the same as that responsible for the Jaipur strikes. But in both Jaipur and Ahmedabad, the serial blasts indicated that the terrorists were local elements who knew the place and easily mingled with the crowd after execution of the deadly act. "This is a bid to Indianise jihad," said Raman who sees HuJI opening a permanent base in India.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/28/2008 00:00 ||
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#1
See COUNTERRORISM BLOG > AL QAEDA AND INDIA - AL QAEDA"S GROWING TENTACLES IN INDIA AND ASIA [SIMI?]; + BIGNEWSNETWORK/TOPIX > INDIAN MUJAHEDEEN STRIKE AGAIN + FIGHTING MAOISTS WITH MANTRAS + CHINESE MUSLIM SEPARATISTS THREATEN OLYMPICS + BANGLADESH WARNS OVER ISLAMIST INCURSIONS FROM MYANMAR.
Also from CT > NY POST - NYC Police getting feelers over possible terror attacks in NYC at end of summer [NEW YORK JIHAD]???
The country again wakes to a morning that is laden with news of the increase in number of dead and injured in another set of bomb blasts. This time it was Ahmedabad and a day before it was Bangalore. Who knows by the time I conclude this write-up another blast could have 'rocked' the nation.
Since October 2005 when a bomb went off in the crowded Sarojini market of Delhi, just a day before Diwali in which more that 60 people died, 11 more such incidents have rattled India, the most deadly being the July 2006 serial blasts in Mumbai's trains in which over 200 people were killed. Not surprisingly, we cannot say that we have been able to solve the cases or even figure out the identity of the perpetrators. In most cases, the obvious answer that one gets from the investigative agencies is the SIMI (Students Islamic Movement of India), the HuJI-B (Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh) or the HuM (Harkat-ul Mujahideen).
The country witnessed its first major strike in 1992 when the financial capital of India was rocked. It was said that the fundamentalist behind the Mumbai attacks were avenging the demolition of the Babri structure and the subsequent riots. Then also the think-tanks of this country talked of formulating counter-terrorism policies that would make such future strikes much harder.
Continued on Page 49
Posted by: Fred ||
07/28/2008 00:00 ||
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#2
Parliament Attack resulted in Op-Prakarm , why are the attacks on innocent civilians not generating such tough response from the government? Why are we getting trampled time and again?
Posted by: David ||
07/28/2008 3:00 Comments ||
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#3
"If you want to end these terror strikes in the world then either accept Islam or wipe out Islam" .
Says it all really.Pithy, succinct and the truth.
Yeah, and that only ensures that the slaughter will be that much greater! It would be better to step on them hard now...or better yet, a decade or two ago.
Posted by: Grease Dark Lord of the Algonquins9226 ||
07/28/2008 13:04 Comments ||
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#2
What a revolting, conniving, manipulative POS.
No wonder the Marines despise him!
Which reminds me of an old joke about news photographers: If you have a choice between rescuing a child drowning in a river or taking a picture of a child drowning in a river, what is the one question that you should ask yourself?
After three deadly bombings and a string of tit-for-tat arrests, tensions between Fatah and Hamas are once again running dangerously high. The last time that the rivalry between the two groups degenerated into street violence nearly a year ago, hundreds of innocent people were killed as a result. If the leaders of both Palestinian factions fail to come to their senses and rein in their respective supporters, the streets of Gaza and/or the Occupied West Bank could soon see yet another needless bloodbath.
Hamas leaders acted rashly when they almost immediately accused Fatah of carrying out an attack in Gaza late Friday night - and then responded by rounding up almost 200 Fatah members and shutting down cultural and sports offices. Fatah upped the ante of irresponsible behavior when it retaliated to Hamas' move by arresting 20 the Islamist group's members in the Occupied West Bank.
Hamas leaders acted rashly when they almost immediately accused Fatah of carrying out an attack in Gaza late Friday night - and then responded by rounding up almost 200 Fatah members and shutting down cultural and sports offices. Fatah upped the ante of irresponsible behavior when it retaliated to Hamas' move by arresting 20 the Islamist group's members in the Occupied West Bank. Both groups know what can happen when these kinds of retaliatory actions get out of hand and both groups now have an urgent responsibility to prevent that from happening again.
Over the past few years, the rivalry between Hamas and Fatah has rapidly made its way up the list of threats to the Palestinians' existence. In some circles, it is still fashionable to blame Israel for all of the Palestinians' troubles, but in this instance, the leaders of Hamas and Fatah have committed crimes of equal magnitude against their own constituents. Not only have scores of people died at the hands of their armed forces, the fighting has also served to greatly undermine the Palestinian cause. It has become increasingly difficult for the international community to feel sympathy for the Palestinian people when their own leaders provide so much media ammunition to distract the world from their plight. The image of lawlessness and internecine warfare conveys the image of a people who are simply not ready for self-governance or an independent state.
The lessons from the Occupied Territories ought to also weigh heavily on Lebanese leaders, who have also shown a propensity to allow their power struggles to degenerate into violence that claims the lives of innocent victims. International mediators will soon grow tired of helping those who show no interest whatsoever in helping themselves.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/28/2008 00:00 ||
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#1
"If the leaders of both Palestinian factions fail to come to their senses and rein in their respective supporters, the streets of Gaza and/or the Occupied West Bank could soon see yet another needless bloodbath"
#6
It has become increasingly difficult for the international community to feel sympathy for the Palestinian people when their own leaders provide so much media ammunition to distract the world from their plight.
But they keep lining up to throw money at them, don't they?
#1
He's right, so you have to wonder why Islam provoked a fight instead of waiting... Unless perhaps the Jihadists know that although birthrates are strong there is something else going on that could threaten things.
There won't be the immigration levels seen in the past (from Algeria (into France), Pakistan )(into the UK) and Turkey (into Germany). European Muslim birthrates are falling. Subsequent generations will be even more alienated from the culture of their parents.
This is a hard thing for the Islamists to accept. The Koran promises that the Muslims will conquer. That the infidel will accept Islam.
The Muslim population in Europe will still be a minority and thus bereft of economic and political power. A minority amidst a majority that doesn't really care about the tenets of Islam.
Islam, an Arab religion, served the socioeconomic interests of certain Arab tribes. When Judaism in the Yeman threatened the interests of Christian Arabs, they took to Islam in order to seize power. Islam thrives when there are nearby cultures and societies available for plunder.
Without military power however, and as a poor minority, the followers of the prophet have far less incentive to remain true to the faith.
It is important for the masses in the Muslim world to believe in the inevitability of Islam though. Hence speeches like that from Amr Khaled will find a ready audience.
Because the truth of their situation will shatter their belief system.
Posted by: john frum ||
07/28/2008 15:11 Comments ||
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#4
Shatter away, I say.
Soonest.
Posted by: Barbara Skolaut ||
07/28/2008 15:13 Comments ||
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#5
Unfortunately the cognitive dissonance that arises from being presented with reality (as opposed to what a Muslim child has been taught) typically finds expression in rage and jihadi activity.
The majority, who are able to reconcile themselves with Islam as a personal belief system confined to the private sphere, rather than an over-arching identity or ideology of supremacy, will be able to adapt.
The minority will lash out...
Posted by: john frum ||
07/28/2008 15:18 Comments ||
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#6
I hope you're right, but I have my doubts. Especially about converts. In any case, I doubt I'll live to see the resolution, so it will neither disturb nor delight.
#7
Alos he is assumming that Muslims in Europe will remain such. May become nominal Muslims and if we had a conceted effort not fpr conversion but fpr protection of apostates Islm in Europe would melt.
#9
European Muslim birthrates are falling. Subsequent generations will be even more alienated from the culture of their parents.
Agreed with the second point, john frum, and your claim about birthrates is plausible, but where did you get that first tidbit?
JosephM, regardless of birthrate increases in China, they are missing so many females in the childrearing generation that it will surely affect population.
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