A Yemeni man named by Saudi Arabia last month as one of its most wanted militant suspects has been in detention in Yemen under another name, the Saudi Interior Ministry said on Saturday. It said Zaid Hassan Humaid, one of 36 men whose names were published by Saudi Arabia in June, had been held in his native country for some time under the name Zaid Hassan Juaidi.
The ministry also said Yemen had handed over 12 Saudi detainees. It gave no details of the men or why they had been arrested. Saudi Arabia has been battling suspected al Qaeda militants since May 2003, after they launched a wave of violence with triple suicide bombings at Western housing compounds in Riyadh. Last week Saudi security forces killed the man at the top of the list of 36 wanted suspects, Moroccan national Younis Mohammad Ibrahim al-Hayyari. One of the suspects flew back to Saudi Arabia from Lebanon and surrendered to authorities. Security sources say two or three men on the list have been killed in Iraq and another is in detention in northern Iraq.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 13:37 ||
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On Fox News TV 2:44PM PST - nothing on the webpage yet
Okay, here's the initial info:
British Evacuate Birmingham District
Police ordered the evacuation of the entertainment district in central Birmingham late Saturday because of intelligence suggesting a security threat.
Police initially restricted road traffic into the city center, but then ordered an evacuation after receiving further intelligence, a police spokeswoman said on condition of anonymity.
She estimated there were nearly 200 bars and clubs in the Broad Street entertainment district.
Birmingham, 110 miles northwest of London, was the target of one of the worst Irish Republican Army bombings of the 1970s. Twenty-one people died when the IRA bombed two pubs on Nov. 21, 1974.
Posted by: Frank G ||
07/09/2005 17:36 ||
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#5
How's this for a campaign slogan: "Muslims Out Now!" I think we're going to see the BNP use that one next election and it's likely to be damned effective.
Posted by: mac ||
07/09/2005 18:39 Comments ||
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#6
BBC now reporting 4 controlled explosions, but no bombs. Looks like an elaborate hoax - packages deliberately left. Or a trial run?
#9
That is why one reason it's called terrorism, not every act need be real one, just the fear it creates in the public will do, picking the UK is a bad plan for that, it hasn't worked in the past, won't now.
London is on the highest state of alert after British security services said on Friday they assumed that the terrorists responsible for Thursday's bomb attacks that killed more than 50 people remained at large and could strike again.
âWe are working on the assumption that those responsible for the bombings are still out there and could do it again. As a result, it's a huge national police operation with the help of foreign police forces,â said a senior British security official.
Police forensic experts continued to comb the crime scenes for clues, a particularly grisly and difficult task in the heat of the deep, rat-infested Underground tunnel near Russell Square where at least 21 people lost their lives.
Sir Ian Blair, London's police commissioner, said the morning rush hour bombings bore all the hallmarks of the al-Qaeda terrorist group: nearly simultaneous attacks with no warning, causing mass casualties.
He described the investigation as âa national enterpriseâ, which would require the fullest support of Londoners across races and faiths. âIt is not the police and intelligence community which defeat terrorism; it's communities that beat terrorism,â he said.
Police remained cautious in their assessment of how the four bomb blasts three on the Underground and one on a bus were carried out. They said the bombs, which also injured some 700 people, each contained 4.5kg or less of Semtex or other commercial high explosive.
They said it was still not clear how they were detonated. One hypothesis is that three devices in the Underground were exploded by simple timers, possibly linked to mobile phones. But police have not ruled out the possibility that the explosion on the bus, which killed 13 people in Tavistock Square, was caused by a suicide bomber or was set off accidentally by a terrorist on the way to another target.
The investigation will include an extensive review of CCTV footage. CCTV density in London is high and experts will be able to review activity along the Tube and bus routes. âThis is the largest CCTV recovery we have ever had to do,â said the senior security official.
Terrorism experts drew parallels with the March 2004 rush hour bombings in Madrid, where some of those responsible were planning further attacks on the public transport system and eventually blew themselves up in a confrontation with police.
Ken Livingstone, London's mayor, said he would travel to work as normal on Monday using the Underground. âThat is the advice I would give to every Londoner that we should keep enjoying the city and living and working in the city.â
He echoed the widespread judgment that the city's emergency response plan had worked well and praised emergency services and transport staff for âacts of courage and selfless dedicationâ. Emergency services on Friday responded to a significant number of false alarms across the city.
âEverything we had planned for on this day we knew would happen, worked like clockwork,â Mr Livingstone said. âOur preparedness has paid off.â
Charles Clarke, the home secretary, urged people to go about their business as normally as possible as transport staff attempted to resume normal services. London Underground was operating a near-normal service, buses were expected to be fully back in action and all the main railway stations were open and running as usual, except King's Cross.
Scotland Yard said it was increasing police patrols to reassure the public as officers gathered evidence from the scenes of the explosions.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 00:18 ||
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Investigators have concluded that the bombs that ripped through three subway trains and a bus on Thursday were relatively crude devices containing less than 10 pounds of explosives each. That finding supports a theory gaining momentum among the authorities that the plot was carried out by a sleeper cell of homegrown extremists rather than highly trained terrorists exported to Britain.
Crucial facts remained unknown in the case Friday evening. But senior British and American investigators said the morning rush-hour attacks in central London appeared to have been a low-tech operation, less expertly conceived than the cellphone-detonated train bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which killed 191 people and wounded more than 1,800.
Officials said at least 49 people had been killed and 700 wounded in the London bombings.
But they said the death toll might have been much higher had the attack been carried out by experts - given the large numbers of commuters crowded into the transit system.
A senior British investigator said Friday that the authorities initially feared "hundreds of people" might have died, and he said they were both surprised and relieved by the relatively low death toll.
There may be other signs that an inexperienced sleeper cell was at work, investigators said. The bombings have so far produced very few leads or possible suspects among the known extremist groups and cells in Britain and the rest of Europe. That could mean, the investigators said, that the bombers never crossed paths with the authorities and might not have been associated with known extremist groups in the past.
Some of the authorities cautioned, though, that the investigation was continuing and that the focus on a homegrown sleeper cell could shift as evidence developed. At this stage, said one senior British investigator who spoke on the condition of anonymity, there was not enough evidence to make "even a sensible guess" about who was responsible.
British and American officials said they were hopeful they would soon get a big break in the case, which would probably come from the forensic analysis at the scenes or the images captured by the closed-circuit television cameras, known as CCTV, installed throughout the London subway system.
Andy Trotter, deputy chief constable of British Transport Police, said a large-scale operation was under way to search the camera tapes for images of the suspects.
"If they weren't suicide bombers, then they must have got on and off these trains," he said. "That means their pictures can be grabbed from CCTV cameras. The Underground network is a CCTV-rich environment, and so this is going to be an intense investigation to look at the images."
Mr. Trotter said the images of the terrorists might also have been captured by cameras as they walked on the sidewalk entering or leaving the subway stations. Most central London streets are covered by cameras whose images are recorded on tape.
In an interview in Washington on Friday, Gary M. Bald, the F.B.I.'s chief of counterintelligence and counterterrorism, would not discuss specifics of the, but he said the bureau had increased personnel in its London liaison office from about six people to about a dozen.
Referring to a possible attack on a mass transit system in Europe or the United States, he said, "We have known that terrorists groups possess the capability to carry out this type of attack," he said. "This has been a concern for some time."
As a painstaking search of the four crime scenes goes on, forensic experts are focusing on the twisted wreckage of one of London's signature double-decker buses, where one of the bombs exploded toward the rear of its second floor near Tavistock Square in the Bloomsbury section of London. Crime scene specialists are conducting DNA swabs in an attempt to identify the bus bomber by looking for a match in DNA samples in databases maintained by Britain and other countries.
The bus bombing is also considered by investigators to be another clue of an amateurish attack. They say they are almost certain that the blast was a mistimed explosion caused when the bomber accidentally detonated the device as it was being taken to its intended target.
Two wounded survivors have told a hospital doctor of a young man, possibly in his 20's, boarding the bus, but then frantically rummaging through a bag before it exploded.
Another passenger, Richard Jones, a 61-year-old computer consultant, told The Daily Mail that he had seen a man in his mid-20's become "extremely agitated" shortly after sitting down.
"This chap started digging down into his bag and getting back up," said Mr. Jones, who reported leaving the bus moments before it exploded. "He did it about a dozen times in two or three minutes and looked extremely agitated."
The search for important evidence includes an effort to locate the bomber's remains and identification cards he might have carried.
The three other bombs were timed to detonate a short time after each train left its station. Senior police officials said Friday that they believed the bombers had left the package bombs on the floor of the trains, hopping off as the doors of the cars were closing. In each case, the bombs exploded about 100 to 150 yards down the tracks from the platform.
The Madrid bombings used small-size explosive devices, but they averaged a heavier 22 pounds each and were detonated within a three-minute period on 10 commuter trains. Each of the Madrid bombs was detonated by the use of the alarm function on cellphones.
A timed detonation system is believed to have been used in the London attacks. "We believe the explosives were detonated in London by some kind of timing device," a British official said, "though at this stage we cannot say if it was a mobile phone or not."
Although their most active theory is that the London bombings were planned and executed by a Britain-based sleeper cell, the authorities are also investigating whether European, North African or Pakistani elements played a role.
Investigators said they wanted to question Zeeshan Haider, 25, a British national arrested in May near Peshawar, in restive North-West Frontier Province. He is being held by the Pakistani authorities.
"There is no evidence right now to link him up to the bombings in London, and everything seems presumptuous," a Pakistani intelligence official said. "But we believe that the guy is worth more than what little he has been telling us."
A senior European intelligence official, who was briefed by Scotland Yard, said, "The British believe that the cell has been in the U.K. for some time, assimilating with the society."
"Part of their thinking is the cell chose a predominantly Muslim neighborhood to launch these attacks," the official added. "The bombers might have thought it would make it easier for them to leave the stations and blend in."
More bodies were expected to be found in the subway tunnel near the King's Cross station. The police declined to say how many bodies remained in the tunnel, but it might be as many as a dozen, one official said.
The work was hampered by a partly collapsed tunnel that blocked access to the blown-apart train. Industrial-strength air coolers were brought into the tunnel to keep the air cool, officials said.
"It's an extremely difficult operation going on in difficult conditions down there," said Mr. Trotter, the deputy chief constable of the Transport Police. "The train is down a tunnel, and it is a very deep line at this point. We've had to bring in some heavy ventilation equipment. The operation involves both the recovery of bodies and also forensic work. It's just too early to say how long it's going to take."
Mr. Bald of the F.B.I. said there was as yet no indication from the London bombing that the United States was under increased threat of attack, although he cautioned that targets like New York, Washington and London, remained high on Al Qaeda's target list.
He said terrorism officials had long been aware of the possibility of a mass transit bombing, especially since the March 2004 attacks in Madrid.
"The attacks in London do not change the general threat we face here in the U.S.," Mr. Bald said. But he cautioned that the investigation might alter that conclusion. "What develops from the investigation of the London attacks could shed light on the threat situation in the U.S.," he said.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 00:08 ||
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#1
A Suprize? Really? Considering that even the Magic Kingdom it's self is not as islamonutsy as Wakipakiland my first guess was that at least some involved have some connection to Pakistan. It can't be anyother way, after it's where the patron saint lives under protection of the inteligence services and military.
#3
There is concern that Sen Dick Durban might hinder
the investigation into the recent 7/7 London subway train bombings
and thus increase the risk of another terrorist attack
by publicly expressing his concerns over how Pakistani authorities
might be handling and treating the uncooperative detainee,
the British national, Zeeshan Haider,
who was recently apprehended in the North-West Frontier region of Pakistan
and held on suspiscion of association with extremists in the area
believed to be the last hide out and stronghold of
Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network.
Posted by: Kristian "Kid" David ||
07/09/2005 3:57 Comments ||
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#4
Forget about 'sleeper cells'. Its reasonably clear these are homegrown jihadis. Mechanical timers and the fact one accidentally boomed himself indicate a self-taught group. One thing caught my attention yesterday - the tube explosions were after the trains had traveled less than two hundred meters from where they believed the boomers left the train. That indicates to me they used a timer the boomer had to set - something like a kitchen timer.
A policeman was killed when his vehicle came under fire in Grozny on Friday.
Fire was opened on Akhmed Khushalapov's vehicle from several passing cars near the local food market, the Chechen Interior Ministry told Interfax. The policeman died of wounds in a hospital.
The assailants stole Khushalapov's Kalashnikov assault rifle, Makarov pistol and cartridges.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 00:44 ||
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Police said Saturday they had arrested 142 people in a two-day anti-terrorism security sweep around Milan prompted by the bombings two days earlier in London.
Some 2,000 carabinieri fanned out across the Lombardy region, stepping up patrols around train stations, subways, commercial centers and other sensitive sites, the regional commander of the paramilitary police, Gen. Antonio Girone, said in a phone interview.
Girone said the operation was focusing on Milan because it had been the major focus of Italian investigations into Islamic terrorism and because it "could be a major risk of possible attacks." He said the measures were designed to make people "feel calmer after the London attacks."
Of those arrested, 84 were immigrants and authorities issued 52 expulsion orders, he said. Most of those arrested were accused on drug, petty theft or immigration-related charges, he said.
The operation was one of the most visible signs of stepped up security measures around Italy following Thursday's attacks in London and threats that Italy might be targeted as well for its support of the U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Interior Ministry said it was stepping up police and intelligence controls around the country, and in particular around sites most at risk of terrorist attack.
British installations in Italy were the top priorities. But some 13,246 sites around the country â including U.S. and
NATO bases, telecommunications centers, public utilities and the Turin 2006
Winter Olympics site â also were under special surveillance and had been since the beginning of the year, the ministry said.
The ministry also said it was looking into possible new emergency legislation to deal with the terrorist risk. It didn't elaborate.
The new measures came after a group calling itself "The Secret Organization of al-Qaida in Europe" said the bombings were punishment for British involvement in the U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and said Italy and Denmark would be attacked for their support of the U.S.-led coalitions in both countries, too.
Premier Silvio Berlusconi said Friday that Italy would begin withdrawing 300 troops from Italy's 3,000-strong contingent in Iraq, but denied the withdrawal was linked to any terrorist threats against Italy. He had previously said he hoped to begin withdrawing troops by September, though officials later pushed the date back to early 2006.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 13:27 ||
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Investigators were picking through torn-up train carriages in tunnels deep below central London today, seeking clues and yet more bodies of victims of the London bombings as the death toll hit 50 amid reports casting suspicion on a Moroccan cleric. Police warned the toll from Thursday's blasts was likely to rise further as rescuers struggled to access the second of three Underground trains targeted, fearing a tunnel might collapse near Russell Square.
Although investigators did not pinpoint any suspects sought in connection with the worst attack London has known since World War II, media reports said police had requested European counterparts seek out information on radical Moroccan cleric Mohammed al-Garbuzi, who lived in Britain for 16 years before vanishing from his north London home last year. Al-Garbuzi, leader of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), is believed to have travelled to France. His group is blamed for attacks that killed 45 people in the Moroccan city of Casablanca in May 2003.
London police refused to comment on reports they are hunting al-Garbuzi, but British newspapers the Daily Mail and the Independent said in their Saturday editions that the police had made "a Europe-wide request for information" on the 45-year-old awarded asylum in Britain a decade ago. The Independent said al-Garbuzi is linked to Abu Qatada, a Palestinian cleric based in London who is considered the "spiritual head" of al-Qaeda in Europe.
Meanwhile, in a chilling echo of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, hand-written posters started to appear at train stations around the British capital as relatives appealed desperately for information on the missing. Lingering uncertainty over the fate of some 25 missing people prolonged the agonised wait of loved ones who had no indication whatsoever of their fate. Most of the city's transport network ran close to normal services, though two of the Underground lines affected by the blasts remained shut. However, many commuters chose to stay at home after an attack that police and government officials have linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist network.
A group calling itself the Organisation of al-Qaeda Jihad in Europe has claimed responsibility for Thursday's attacks via an internet statement but the message's authenticity could not be confirmed. British Interior Minister Charles Clarke said there was a "strong possibility" an al-Qaeda linked group committed the attacks, but added they "came out of the blue" and did not represent a failure by intelligence services. An Islamic leader had warned in a Portuguese newspaper interview 15 months ago that a London-based group, al-Qaeda Europe, was on the verge of a major attack. "Here in London there is a very well-organised group, which calls itself al-Qaeda-Europe," Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, the Syrian head of the London-based group Al-Muhajiroun, told the Portuguese newspaper Publico in an interview published on April 18 last year.
Police vowed to catch the perpetrators behind the blasts that, in the space of 56 minutes, sliced the roof off the bus - killing 13 alone - and slaughtered dozens in packed London Underground commuter trains. "That is something we will bend every sinew of the Metropolitan Police Service ... to do. The entire weight of the anti-terrorist branch of Scotland Yard is aimed implacably ... at this operation," said the head of London's police force, Commissioner Ian Blair.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 00:31 ||
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#1
' "Here in London there is a very well-organised group, which calls itself al-Qaeda-Europe," Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, the Syrian head '
Syrian? Oh, Jeez. Let me guess... between the ages of 36-49 and emigrated from Syrian round about say... 1982. Those guys show up in all the wrong places.
#2
al mahajiroun recently disbanded in england because this dickhead knew this was coming--i'd snatch him and put him on a rack till he squeals like a stuck pig--the brits should set up a prison camp for these chaps in bermuda in keeping with the caribbean motif in jihadi accomodations
Posted by: SON OF TOLUI ||
07/09/2005 11:45 Comments ||
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#3
SON OF TOLU - Bermuda is too nice a place. Read up on the western plains of Ascension - 110 in the shade, and there's no shade. Strict salt pan for miles in every direction. Baking heat, and the wind is blocked by a mountain. Good place for mooselimbs, either whole or in pieces.
Posted by: Old Patriot ||
07/09/2005 20:27 Comments ||
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#4
Death Valley. Have them mine borax.
Posted by: Robert Crawford ||
07/09/2005 21:10 Comments ||
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#5
with a spork
Posted by: Frank G ||
07/09/2005 21:29 Comments ||
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A judge on Friday convicted and sentenced to life in prison three members of the Red Brigades terrorist group for the 1999 killing of a government labor adviser, court officials said. A fourth was convicted and sentenced to nine years. Prosecutors had asked for life terms for all four, who were accused of gunning down Massimo D'Antona in Rome in May 1999 while he was working on labor market reforms that were bitterly contested by Italy's labor unions. Sentenced to life terms were Nadia Desdemona Lioce, Marco Mezzasalma and Roberto Morandi. Paolo Broccatelli received a nine-year term. There was no explanation for the ruling; Italian judges provide written explanations of their verdicts several weeks after they are issued. Several other defendants on trial were given lesser sentences.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/09/2005 00:00 ||
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"In August 1998, the detainee traveled to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi Intelligence for the purpose of blowing up the Pakistan, United States and British embassies with chemical mortars."
U.S. government "Summary of Evidence" for an Iraqi member of al Qaeda detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
FOR MANY, the debate over the former Iraqi regime's ties to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network ended a year ago with the release of the 9/11 Commission report. Media outlets seized on a carefully worded summary that the commission had found no evidence "indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States" and ran blaring headlines like the one on the June 17, 2004, front page of the New York Times: "Panel Finds No Qaeda-Iraq Tie."
But this was woefully imprecise. It assumed, not unreasonably, that the 9/11 Commission's conclusion was based on a firm foundation of intelligence reporting, that the intelligence community had the type of human intelligence and other reporting that would allow senior-level analysts to draw reasonable conclusions. We know now that was not the case.
John Lehman, a 9/11 commissioner, spoke to The Weekly Standard at the time the report was released. "There may well be--and probably will be--additional intelligence coming in from interrogations and from analysis of captured records and so forth which will fill out the intelligence picture. This is not phrased as--nor meant to be--the definitive word on Iraqi Intelligence activities."
Lehman's caution was prescient. A year later, we still cannot begin to offer a "definitive" picture of the relationships entered into by Saddam Hussein's operatives, but much more has already been learned from documents uncovered after the Iraq war. The evidence we present below, compiled from revelations in recent months, suggests an acute case of denial on the part of those who dismiss the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship.
There could hardly be a clearer case--of the ongoing revelations and the ongoing denial--than in the 13 points below, reproduced verbatim from a "Summary of Evidence" prepared by the U.S. government in November 2004. This unclassified document was released by the Pentagon in late March 2005. It details the case for designating an Iraqi member of al Qaeda, currently detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as an "enemy combatant."
1. From 1987 to 1989, the detainee served as an infantryman in the Iraqi Army and received training on the mortar and rocket propelled grenades.
2. A Taliban recruiter in Baghdad convinced the detainee to travel to Afghanistan to join the Taliban in 1994.
3. The detainee admitted he was a member of the Taliban.
4. The detainee pledged allegiance to the supreme leader of the Taliban to help them take over all of Afghanistan.
5. The Taliban issued the detainee a Kalishnikov rifle in November 2000.
6. The detainee worked in a Taliban ammo and arms storage arsenal in Mazar-Es-Sharif organizing weapons and ammunition.
7. The detainee willingly associated with al Qaida members.
8. The detainee was a member of al Qaida.
9. An assistant to Usama Bin Ladin paid the detainee on three separate occasions between 1995 and 1997.
10. The detainee stayed at the al Farouq camp in Darwanta, Afghanistan, where he received 1,000 Rupees to continue his travels.
11. From 1997 to 1998, the detainee acted as a trusted agent for Usama Bin Ladin, executing three separate reconnaissance missions for the al Qaeda leader in Oman, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
12. In August 1998, the detainee traveled to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi Intelligence for the purpose of blowing up the Pakistan, United States and British embassies with chemical mortars.
13. Detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities in Khudzar, Pakistan, in July 2002.
Interesting. What's more interesting: The alleged plot was to have taken place in August 1998, the same month that al Qaeda attacked two U.S. embassies in East Africa. And more interesting still: It was to have taken place in the same month that the Clinton administration publicly accused Iraq of supplying al Qaeda with chemical weapons expertise and material.
But none of this was interesting enough for any of the major television networks to cover it. Nor was it deemed sufficiently newsworthy to merit a mention in either the Washington Post or the New York Times.
The Associated Press, on the other hand, probably felt obliged to run a story, since the "Summary of Evidence" was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the AP itself. But after briefly describing the documents, the AP article downplayed its own scoop with a sentence almost as amusing as it is inane: "There is no indication the Iraqi's alleged terror-related activities were on behalf of Saddam Hussein's government, other than the brief mention of him traveling to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi intelligence." That sentence minimizing the importance of the findings was enough, apparently, to convince most newspaper editors around the country not to run the AP story.
It's possible, of course, that the evidence presented by military prosecutors is exaggerated, maybe even wrong. The evidence required to designate a detainee an "enemy combatant" is lower than the "reasonable doubt" standard of U.S. criminal prosecutions. So there is much we don't know.
Indeed,
more than two years after the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was ousted, there is much we do not know about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. We do know, however, that there was one. We know about this relationship not from Bush administration assertions but from internal Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) documents recovered in Iraq after the war--documents that have been authenticated by a U.S. intelligence community long hostile to the very idea that any such relationship exists.
We know from these IIS documents that beginning in 1992 the former Iraqi regime regarded bin Laden as an Iraqi Intelligence asset. We know from IIS documents that the former Iraqi regime provided safe haven and financial support to an Iraqi who has admitted to mixing the chemicals for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. We know from IIS documents that Saddam Hussein agreed to Osama bin Laden's request to broadcast anti-Saudi propaganda on Iraqi state-run television. We know from IIS documents that a "trusted confidante" of bin Laden stayed for more than two weeks at a posh Baghdad hotel as the guest of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.
We have been told by Hudayfa Azzam, the son of bin Laden's longtime mentor Abdullah Azzam, that Saddam Hussein welcomed young al Qaeda members "with open arms" before the war, that they "entered Iraq in large numbers, setting up an organization to confront the occupation," and that the regime "strictly and directly" controlled their activities. We have been told by Jordan's King Abdullah that his government knew Abu Musab al Zarqawi was in Iraq before the war and requested that the former Iraqi regime deport him. We have been told by Time magazine that confidential documents from Zarqawi's group, recovered in recent raids, indicate other jihadists had joined him in Baghdad before the Hussein regime fell. We have been told by one of those jihadists that he was with Zarqawi in Baghdad before the war. We have been told by Ayad Allawi, former Iraqi prime minister and a longtime CIA source, that other Iraqi Intelligence documents indicate bin Laden's top deputy was in Iraq for a jihadist conference in September 1999.
All of this is new--information obtained since the fall of the Hussein regime. And yet critics of the Iraq war and many in the media refuse to see it. Just two weeks ago, President Bush gave a prime-time speech on Iraq. Among his key points: Iraq is a central front in the global war on terror that began on September 11. Bush spoke in very general terms. He did not mention any of this new information on Iraqi support for terrorism to make his case. That didn't matter to many journalists and critics of the war.
CNN anchor Carol Costello claimed "there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was connected in any way to al Qaeda." The charitable explanation is ignorance. Jay Rockefeller, the West Virginia Democrat who serves as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, knows better. Before the war he pointed to Zarqawi's presence in Iraq as a "substantial connection between Iraq and al Qaeda." And yet he, too, now insists that Saddam Hussein's regime "had nothing to do with Osama bin Laden, it had nothing to do with al Qaeda."
Such comments reveal far more about politics in America than they do about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship.
Interesting. What's more interesting: The alleged plot was to have taken place in August 1998, the same month that al Qaeda attacked two U.S. embassies in East Africa. And more interesting still: It was to have taken place in the same month that the Clinton administration publicly accused Iraq of supplying al Qaeda with chemical weapons expertise and material.
But none of this was interesting enough for any of the major television networks to cover it. Nor was it deemed sufficiently newsworthy to merit a mention in either the Washington Post or the New York Times.
The Associated Press, on the other hand, probably felt obliged to run a story, since the "Summary of Evidence" was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the AP itself. But after briefly describing the documents, the AP article downplayed its own scoop with a sentence almost as amusing as it is inane: "There is no indication the Iraqi's alleged terror-related activities were on behalf of Saddam Hussein's government, other than the brief mention of him traveling to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi intelligence." That sentence minimizing the importance of the findings was enough, apparently, to convince most newspaper editors around the country not to run the AP story.
It's possible, of course, that the evidence presented by military prosecutors is exaggerated, maybe even wrong. The evidence required to designate a detainee an "enemy combatant" is lower than the "reasonable doubt" standard of U.S. criminal prosecutions. So there is much we don't know.
Indeed,
more than two years after the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was ousted, there is much we do not know about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. We do know, however, that there was one. We know about this relationship not from Bush administration assertions but from internal Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) documents recovered in Iraq after the war--documents that have been authenticated by a U.S. intelligence community long hostile to the very idea that any such relationship exists.
We know from these IIS documents that beginning in 1992 the former Iraqi regime regarded bin Laden as an Iraqi Intelligence asset. We know from IIS documents that the former Iraqi regime provided safe haven and financial support to an Iraqi who has admitted to mixing the chemicals for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. We know from IIS documents that Saddam Hussein agreed to Osama bin Laden's request to broadcast anti-Saudi propaganda on Iraqi state-run television. We know from IIS documents that a "trusted confidante" of bin Laden stayed for more than two weeks at a posh Baghdad hotel as the guest of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.
We have been told by Hudayfa Azzam, the son of bin Laden's longtime mentor Abdullah Azzam, that Saddam Hussein welcomed young al Qaeda members "with open arms" before the war, that they "entered Iraq in large numbers, setting up an organization to confront the occupation," and that the regime "strictly and directly" controlled their activities. We have been told by Jordan's King Abdullah that his government knew Abu Musab al Zarqawi was in Iraq before the war and requested that the former Iraqi regime deport him. We have been told by Time magazine that confidential documents from Zarqawi's group, recovered in recent raids, indicate other jihadists had joined him in Baghdad before the Hussein regime fell. We have been told by one of those jihadists that he was with Zarqawi in Baghdad before the war. We have been told by Ayad Allawi, former Iraqi prime minister and a longtime CIA source, that other Iraqi Intelligence documents indicate bin Laden's top deputy was in Iraq for a jihadist conference in September 1999.
All of this is new--information obtained since the fall of the Hussein regime. And yet critics of the Iraq war and many in the media refuse to see it. Just two weeks ago, President Bush gave a prime-time speech on Iraq. Among his key points: Iraq is a central front in the global war on terror that began on September 11. Bush spoke in very general terms. He did not mention any of this new information on Iraqi support for terrorism to make his case. That didn't matter to many journalists and critics of the war.
CNN anchor Carol Costello claimed "there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was connected in any way to al Qaeda." The charitable explanation is ignorance. Jay Rockefeller, the West Virginia Democrat who serves as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, knows better. Before the war he pointed to Zarqawi's presence in Iraq as a "substantial connection between Iraq and al Qaeda." And yet he, too, now insists that Saddam Hussein's regime "had nothing to do with Osama bin Laden, it had nothing to do with al Qaeda."
Such comments reveal far more about politics in America than they do about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship.
* * *
"Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi regime's possible links to al Qaeda."
Senate Intelligence Committee report, July 7, 2004
UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE IRAQ WAR, the consensus view within the U.S. intelligence community was simple: Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were natural enemies who, despite their common interests, would not work together. Daniel Benjamin, a senior counterterrorism official in the Clinton administration, summarized this view in a New York Times op-ed on September 30, 2002. He wrote: "Saddam Hussein has long recognized that al Qaeda and like-minded Islamists represent a threat to his regime. Consequently, he has shown no interest in working with them against their common enemy, the United States. This was the understanding of American intelligence in the 1990s."
Benjamin later elaborated in an interview with Mother Jones. "In 1998, we went through every piece of intelligence we could find to see if there was a link [between] al Qaeda and Iraq. We came to the conclusion that our intelligence agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq. I know that for a fact."
Judith Yaphe, a longtime CIA analyst on the Middle East and Iraq, was only slightly less categorical in testimony before the House Armed Service Committee on April 21, 2004. "I know that there's a small number of people who say that Saddam was working cooperatively with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. I do not believe that. I know the intelligence is not there."
Yaphe was right about one thing: The intelligence was not there. The CIA's collection against the Iraqi target was abysmal. According to former CIA director George Tenet, the U.S. intelligence community never penetrated the senior ranks of the former Iraqi regime. Bob Woodward of the Washington Post explored this subject in his book on the Iraq war, Plan of Attack. Woodward interviewed "Saul," the chief of the Iraqi Operations Group, at the CIA.
Saul was discovering that the CIA reporting sources inside Iraq were pretty thin. What was thin? "I can count them on one hand," Saul said, pausing for effect, "and I can still pick my nose." There were four. And those sources were in Iraqi ministries such as foreign affairs and oil that were on the periphery of any penetration of Saddam's inner circle.
Woodward reports that the Iraqi Operations Group was known inside the CIA's Near East Division as "The House of Broken Toys." "It was largely populated with new, green [Directorate of Operations] officers and problem officers, or old boys waiting for retirement. . . . Past operations read almost like a handbook for failed and stupid covert action. It was a catalogue of doomed work--too little, too late, too seat-of-the-pants, too little planning, too little realism. The comic mixed with the frightening."
The Senate Select Intelligence Committee did not find it so amusing. The committee's bipartisan report was released last summer. Most of the attention at the time focused on the report's assessment of flaws in intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. The lengthy section on "Iraq's Links to Terrorism" received considerably less attention. What emerges in the 66 pages of the report is a picture of an intelligence community with a woefully inadequate collection capability on the Iraqi target. In some ways more disturbing, though, was the lack of interest. In a stunning moment of candor, an "IC analyst" provided this characterization of the collection effort on Iraq: "I don't think we were really focused on the CT [counterterrorism] side, because we weren't concerned about the IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Service] going out and proactively conducting terrorist attacks. It wasn't until we realized that there was the possibility of going to war that we had to get a handle on that."
So on the one hand we know that there was virtually no human intelligence on Iraq and terrorism. Yet the intelligence community, if this analyst is to be believed, was so confident in its assessment that Iraqi Intelligence was not in the terrorism business that collecting on that target was tantamount to cramming for a test.
The Senate report's conclusions were devastating:
Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi regime's possible links to al Qaeda. . . . The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not have a focused human intelligence (HUMINT) collection strategy targeting Iraq's links to terrorism until 2002. The CIA had no [redacted] sources on the ground in Iraq reporting specifically on terrorism.
It was not just reporting on Iraq that was inadequate. "The CIA had no [redacted] credible reporting on the leadership of either the Iraqi regime or al Qaeda, which would have enabled it to better define a cooperative relationship, if any did in fact exist."
This left policymakers in a bind. There was reporting on the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, but much of it was secondhand. This reporting was supplemented by widespread coverage of the Iraq-al Qaeda connection in "open sources," including the amnesiac American press. And contrary to the assessments coming from many analysts in the intelligence community, much of this reporting seemed to indicate a significant relationship.
The difference between most intelligence community analysts and Bush administration policymakers can be found in how they interpret the gaps. The analysts seemed to assume, despite the history of poor collection, that the many Iraq-al Qaeda contacts reported in intelligence products and open sources were anomalous. To them, the gaps in reporting simply reflected a lack of activity. Policymakers (and a small number of analysts) took a different view. The gaps in reporting on Iraq and al Qaeda were just that: gaps in reporting. To this group, the many reports of contacts, training, and offers of safe haven were indicative of a relationship that ran much deeper.
After September 11, the mere existence of a long relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda had to be considered an urgent threat.
* * *
"Attack them our beloved people. You are the glory of our nation. Attack them. . . . The Mother of all Battles is not the past."
Saddam Hussein, January 17, 1993
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY was apparently not much concerned by Iraqi support for terrorism in the 13 years between the Gulf war and the Iraq war. To students of Iraq-U.S. relations that might seem bizarre. Saddam Hussein had used such asymmetric warfare for decades, against enemies foreign and domestic, real and imagined. What's more, he had demonstrated his willingness to use terrorism and terrorist surrogates against his enemies when confronted by superior conventional military forces during the Gulf war. By some accounts, more than 1,400 terrorists made their way to Baghdad in the final months of 1990 as he prepared to face the coalition assembled by the United States to oust him from Kuwait. He dispatched others to attack U.S. interests around the world. On January 18, 1991, one day after the Gulf war began, an Iraqi terrorist posing as a day laborer managed to plant 26 sticks of TNT in a flower box below a window of the U.S. ambassador's residence in Jakarta, Indonesia. The dynamite wasn't completely buried, and a gardener found it before the bomb exploded. The following day in the Philippines, two Iraqis blew themselves up in a plot known to CIA veterans as Operation Dogmeat, a botched attempt to bomb the U.S. Information Service headquarters at the Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center in Manila. The failed attack on the U.S. government-run center received the active support of the Iraqi ambassador to the Philippines.
Saddam Hussein openly encouraged these attacks. "It remains for us to tell all Arabs, all militant believers . . . wherever they may be that it is your duty to embark on holy war. You should target their interests wherever they may be," he said on January 20, 1991.
Iraq's use of terrorism was so widespread, in fact, that it became an issue in the 1992 presidential campaign, when Al Gore accused the first Bush administration of a "blatant disregard for brutal terrorism" practiced by Hussein and ignoring Iraq's "extensive terrorism activities."
Many Islamic radicals voiced opposition to Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait. Sudan's Hasan al-Turabi was not one of them. Turabi's willingness to back Hussein gave the Iraqi dictator the Islamist street credibility he would exploit for years to come. In the debate over the former Iraqi regime's relationship with al Qaeda, it is often said that Saddam's secular Baathist regime could never work with Osama bin Laden's radical Islamist organization. It is a curious argument since Turabi, one of Saddam's staunchest allies, also happened to be one of the most influential Islamists of the past two decades. One of the principal architects of Sudan's Islamist revolution in 1989, Turabi was also the longtime mentor, friend, and host of Osama bin Laden during his stay in Sudan from 1992 until 1996.
Immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, bin Laden approached the Saudi regime and offered to lead Muslim forces in driving Saddam out of Kuwait. Many who downplay the relationship between the former Iraqi regime and al Qaeda point to this as an example of the hostility between Hussein and bin Laden. But Osama's spurned offer is only part of the story. While bin Laden's first instinct may have been to oppose the secular tyrant, his soon-to-be host in Sudan did not share these sentiments. According to an interview at the time with Turabi's cousin, Mudawi Turabi, the Sudanese leader met twice with Saddam Hussein before the Gulf war and "had appeared to be designing his own Islamic empire even then."
In October 1990, Turabi led a delegation of Islamists to Jordan to meet with Iraqi government officials. Bin Laden sent emissaries to this meeting as well. While it is not clear what bin Laden's emissaries or bin Laden himself thought of the meeting, it is clear that Turabi threw his full support behind Saddam. In a press conference after the meeting, Turabi warned "there is going to be all forms of jihad all over the world because it is an issue of foreign troops on sacred soil."
Turabi continued in his self-designated role as pan-Islamic leader by convening terrorist confabs in Khartoum known euphemistically as the Popular Arab Islamic Conference. Encouraged by Turabi, Saddam began hosting his own Popular Islamic Conference in Baghdad. The conferences shared a central purpose: to bring together Islamic and secular radicals from around the world to oppose U.S. involvement in the Gulf war and the continued presence of American troops on Saudi soil.
The Baghdad conferences, which were held annually until the regime fell, were filled with the rhetoric of jihad. A statement issued at the closing ceremony of the 1992 conference was a call to arms. The 500 Islamists in attendance affirmed "that maintaining and defending the unity of Iraq's land, people and sovereignty is an Islamic duty that must be performed because Iraq is the fortress of Islamic jihad targeted by the atheist forces." The statement called on Islamic groups "to meet and discuss the establishment [of] a free world front to confront the U.S. hegemony and its new world order."
Newsweek reporter Christopher Dickey attended a Popular Islamic Conference at Baghdad's al Rashid Hotel and later recalled: "If that was not a fledgling al Qaeda at the Rashid convention, it sure was Saddam's version of it."
We do not yet know how many future al Qaeda leaders attended the conferences. (We do know that the conferences were carried on Iraqi state-run television and that the attendees signed the closing statements. A comparison of those lists with known al Qaeda terrorists would be an interesting and potentially productive undertaking, as would a careful review of any photographic evidence from the session.) By this time, however, it appears that Hussein had already forged relationships with the two men who would later lead al Qaeda.
An internal Iraqi Intelligence memo dated March 28, 1992, lists individuals Hussein's regime considered assets of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Osama bin Laden is listed on page 14. The Iraqis describe him as a Saudi businessman who "is in good relationship with our section in Syria."
At the same time, the Iraqis were cultivating a relationship with Ayman al Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the current top deputy to bin Laden. According to Qassem Hussein Mohammed, a 20-year veteran of Iraqi Intelligence, Zawahiri visited Baghdad in 1992 for a meeting with Hussein. In a 2002 interview with the New Yorker's Jeffrey Goldberg from a Kurdish prison in northeastern Iraq, the IIS veteran described his duties as a bodyguard for Zawahiri during his visit. This was not Zawahiri's only meeting with top Iraqi officials. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi Intelligence official, Zawahiri met with Iraqi Intelligence officials in Sudan several times from 1992 to 1995. A foreign intelligence service has corroborated that report, adding that at one of those meetings Zawahiri received blank Yemeni passports from an Iraqi Intelligence official.
In 1993, at Turabi's urging, bin Laden came to an "understanding" with Saddam Hussein that the al Qaeda leader and his followers would not engage in any anti-Hussein activities. The Clinton administration later included this development in its sealed indictment of bin Laden in 1998. According to the indictment: "Al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq."
* * *
"Abdul Rahman Yasin, a fugitive of the [1993 World Trade Center] attack, is of Iraqi descent, and in 1993, he fled to Iraq with Iraqi assistance."
Senate Intelligence Committee report
ON FEBRUARY 26, 1993, a powerful bomb exploded in the garage of the World Trade Center in New York City. The attack killed six and injured more than 1,000. It could have been much worse. The bombers hoped to topple one tower into the other. The men responsible for the attack aimed to kill tens of thousands of Americans.
One of those men was Abdul Rahman Yasin, an Iraqi who had come to the United States six months before the attack. In the days after the attack, Yasin was detained twice by the FBI. Although he admitted his role in the bombing and offered investigators details of the plot, he was inexplicably released. Twice. The second time the FBI even drove him home. According to the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report, Yasin promptly "fled to Iraq with Iraqi assistance." His travel was arranged by the second secretary of the Iraqi embassy in Amman, Jordan. In 1994, a reporter for ABC News went to the home of Yasin's father in Baghdad and spoke with neighbors who reported that Yasin was free to come and go as he pleased and was "working for the government."
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the Iraqi regime denied any relationship with Yasin and any knowledge of his whereabouts. In an interview with PBS's Frontline that aired on October 29, 2001, Iraq's U.N. ambassador denied that Yasin was even in Iraq. "To my knowledge he is not, and there is not any relation with him." Pressed, the Iraqi diplomat went further. "Absolutely. I know that there is no relation with that guy. . . . We have no relations with these kind of guys, with all persons who are involved in terrorism."
Eight months later, on June 2, 2002, the Iraqi government abruptly changed its story. Tariq Aziz, for years the face of the Iraqi regime in the Western media, appeared on 60 Minutes and assured Lesley Stahl that Yasin had been imprisoned since his return to Iraq. Aziz claimed that the Iraqi regime held Yasin prisoner because they worried that the United States would blame Iraq for the attack if he was returned to America to face trial. Yasin himself appeared. He admitted to mixing the chemicals for the bomb. He showed viewers a scar on his leg that he claimed to have gotten preparing chemicals for the attack. He even apologized. Stahl did not ask about the Frontline interview or previous media reports that Yasin was living freely in Baghdad.
We now know more about Yasin's stay in Baghdad. "We know, for example, in connection with the original World Trade Center bombing in '93 that one of the bombers was Iraqi, returned to Iraq after the attack of '93," Vice President Dick Cheney told Tim Russert in a September 14, 2003, appearance on Meet the Press. "And we've learned subsequent to that, since we went into Baghdad and got into the intelligence files, that this individual probably also received financing from the Iraqi government as well as safe haven. Now, is there a connection between the Iraqi government and the original World Trade Center bombing in '93? We know, as I say, that one of the perpetrators of that act did, in fact, receive support from the Iraqi government after the fact."
Those documents are now in possession of the FBI. Despite requests for declassification of the documents from both Cheney's office and the Pentagon, the FBI refuses to release them. In March, The Weekly Standard requested an interview with FBI officials to discuss the Iraqi intelligence documents and the status of the Yasin case. The request was denied last week. An FBI spokeswoman said FBI officials refuse to discuss Yasin. Yasin remains on the FBI's "Most Wanted Terrorists" list and is believed to be still in Iraq. If there is a good reason to keep these historical documents classified, the FBI declined to provide it.
Just two months after the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the Iraqi Intelligence Service attempted to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush. The IIS recruited a male nurse from Najaf as a suicide bomber to kill the former president on a trip to Kuwait. The plot was foiled when Kuwaiti police, thinking they had broken up a smuggling ring, learned of the Iraqi plans. The Clinton administration responded by bombing an empty Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters at night.
* * *
"Cooperation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop freely through discussion and agreement."
Internal Iraqi Intelligence memo on Iraq-al Qaeda cooperation, June 25, 2004, New York Times
THE RELATIONSHIP CONTINUED with high-level meetings throughout 1994 and 1995. The 9/11 Commission staff report that made headlines last year by declaring that such meetings between Iraq and al Qaeda "do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship" also reported that the Sudanese government arranged for "contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda." The staff report continued: "A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting bin Laden in 1994. Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded."
That senior Iraqi intelligence officer was Faruq Hijazi, former deputy director of Iraqi Intelligence and longtime regime liaison to al Qaeda. According to several Bush administration officials with access to his debriefings, as well as a top secret Pentagon summary of intelligence on Iraq and al Qaeda known as the Feith Memo, Hijazi described a face-to-face meeting with bin Laden that took place in 1994. The language in the Feith Memo corresponds closely to that in the 9/11 Commission staff report. "During a May 2003 custodial interview with Faruq Hijazi, he said in a 1994 meeting with bin Laden in the Sudan, bin Laden requested that Iraq assist al Qaeda with the procurement of an unspecified number of Chinese-manufactured antiship limpet mines. Bin Laden thought that Iraq should be able to procure the mines through third-country intermediaries for ultimate delivery to al Qaeda. Hijazi said he was under orders from Saddam only to listen to bin Laden's requests and then report back to him. Bin Laden also requested the establishment of al Qaeda training camps inside Iraq."
An internal Iraqi Intelligence document obtained by the New York Times provides a window into the state of the relationship during the mid-1990s. A team of Pentagon analysts concluded that the document "appears authentic." The memo reports that a Sudanese government official met with Uday Hussein and the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in 1994 and reported that Bin Laden was willing to meet in Sudan. As a consequence, according to the Iraqi document, bin Laden was "approached by our side" after "presidential approval" for the liaison was given. The former head of Iraqi Intelligence Directorate 4 met with bin Laden on February 19, 1995. The document further states that bin Laden "had some reservations about being labeled an Iraqi operative."
But the absence of a formal relationship hardly precludes cooperation, as the document makes clear. Bin Laden requested that Iraq's state-run television network broadcast anti-Saudi propaganda; the document indicates that the Iraqis agreed to do this. The al Qaeda leader also proposed "joint operations against foreign forces" in Saudi Arabia. There is no response provided in the documents. When bin Laden leaves Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, the Iraqis seek "other channels through which to handle the relationship, in light of his current location." The IIS memo directs that "cooperation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop freely through discussion and agreement."
There are other reports of varying reliability of Iraqi support for al Qaeda during the mid-1990s. One senior al Qaeda operative in U.S. custody since 1995, Wali Khan Amin Shah, told FBI interrogators that an al Qaeda leader named Abu Hajer al Iraqi maintained a good relationship with Iraqi Intelligence. Abu Hajer al Iraqi ran al Qaeda's WMD procurement operation until his capture in 1998 and was described by another al Qaeda member as Osama bin Laden's "best friend." According to the Senate Intelligence Committee report, Wali Khan testified that he had knowledge of two "direct meetings" between the leadership of Iraqi Intelligence and Abu Hajer al Iraqi.
According to the presentation at the United Nations Security Council by Colin Powell on February 5, 2003, an al Qaeda member named Abu Abdullah al Iraqi received training in chemical and biological weapons in Iraq beginning in 1997. The information comes from another high-ranking al Qaeda detainee named Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, who ran bin Laden's notorious Khalden Camp outside of Kandahar. Said Powell: "The support that [al-Libi] describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al Qaeda associates, beginning in December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gases. Abdullah al-Iraqi characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as 'successful.'" Al-Libi's reporting also formed the basis of several statements from CIA Director George Tenet.
Al-Libi has since recanted some of the information he provided. The debate about whether to give more credence to his original statement or his retraction continues. But the Senate Intelligence Committee report concluded that the terrorism section of Powell's speech "was carefully vetted by both terrorism and regional analysts" and that it did not differ "in any significant way" from earlier published CIA assessments.
* * *
"To gain the knowledge of the message from bin Laden and to convey to his envoy an oral message from us to bin Laden, the Saudi opposition leader, about the future of our relationship with him, and to achieve a direct meeting with him."
Internal Iraqi Intelligence memo describing the goal of meetings with an al Qaeda envoy, February 19, 1998
BY ALL ACCOUNTS, the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda intensified in 1998. The Iraqis were growing more obdurate in their confrontation with the U.N. weapons inspectors, at times simply refusing to grant access to suspected weapons sites. The United States was losing patience--both with Iraq and with U.N. fecklessness. Al Qaeda, meanwhile, had found a home in Afghanistan and was turning out terrorists from its camps by the thousands.
On February 3, 1998, Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden's Egyptian deputy, came to Baghdad for meetings with Iraqi leaders. The visit came as Islamic radicals gathered once again in the Iraqi capital for another installation of Hussein's Popular Islamic Conferences. Iraqi vice president Taha Yasin Ramadan welcomed them on February 9 with the language of jihad:
The Islamic nation's ulema, advocates and preachers, are called upon to carry out a jihad that God wants them to carry out through honest words in order to expose the U.S. and Zionist regimes to the world peoples, to explain facts, and to say what is right and to call for it. This is their religious duty. The Muslim ulema are called upon before Almighty God to act among the Muslim ranks to confront the infidel U.S. moves and to raise their voices against the U.S.-Zionist evil.
We do not have reporting on when, exactly, Zawahiri left Baghdad. But we do know from an interrogation of a senior Iraqi Intelligence official that he did not leave empty-handed. As first reported in U.S. News & World Report, the Iraqi regime gave Zawahiri $300,000 during or shortly after his trip to Baghdad.
On February 17, 1998, Bill Clinton traveled the short distance from the White House to the Pentagon to prepare the nation for a confrontation with Iraq. The symbolism was obvious, the rhetoric belligerent. Clinton explained why "meeting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is important to our security in the new era we are entering." He warned about the threats from the "predators of the 21st century," rogue states working with terrorist groups. "There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq." War seemed imminent.
The envoy is a trusted confidant and known by them. According to the above mediation we request official permission to call Khartoum station to facilitate the travel arrangements for the above-mentioned person to Iraq. And that our body carry all the travel and hotel expenses inside Iraq to gain the knowledge of the message from bin Laden and to convey to his envoy an oral message from us to bin Laden, the Saudi opposition leader, about the future of our relationship with him, and to achieve a direct meeting with him.
A note at the bottom of the page from the director of one IIS division recommends approving the request, noting, "we may find in this envoy a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden."
Four days later, on February 23, final approval is granted. "The permission of Mr. Deputy Director of Intelligence has been gained on 21 February for this operation, to secure a reservation for one of the intelligence services guests for one week in one of the first class hotels," the Al Mansour Melia hotel in Baghdad.
That same day, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, joined by leaders of four additional Islamic terrorist groups, announced the formation of the World Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, soon to become better known as al Qaeda. The grievances in the fatwa focused on Iraq. The terrorist leaders decried the presence of U.S. troops on the Arabian Peninsula. They protested the "great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance." They cited American support for Israel and surmised that the United States sought to distract world attention from the killing of Muslims in Jerusalem. To support this claim, the fatwa turned once again to Iraq: "The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state."
The fatwa declared: "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."
The al Qaeda envoy to Iraq arrived in Baghdad on March 5, 1998. Notes in the margins of the Iraqi Intelligence memos indicate that Mohammed F. Mohammed stayed for more than two weeks in Room 414 of the Al Mansour Melia Hotel as the guest of Iraqi Intelligence. After extending his trip by one week, bin Laden's emissary departed on March 16.
Adding to the intrigue, the 9/11 Commission reported that "[i]n March 1998, after bin Laden's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence." Were there two separate al Qaeda trips to Iraq in March 1998? It's possible that the IIS documents and the 9/11 Commission report refer to the same meeting. But the Iraqi Intelligence documents refer to one al Qaeda envoy, the 9/11 Commission report mentions two--raising the possibility that two separate meetings took place.
* * *
"The consistent stream of intelligence at that time said it wasn't just al Shifa. There were three different [chemical weapons] structures in the Sudan. There was the hiring of Iraqis. There was no question that the Iraqis were there."
Interview with John Gannon, former chairman of the CIA's National Intelligence Council, October 25, 2004
OPEN SOURCE REPORTING suggests the relationship continued throughout the spring and summer of 1998. William Safire of the New York Times and Yossef Bodansky, former director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, have both reported the presence of an al Qaeda delegation at a birthday celebration for Saddam Hussein in April 1998.
In a speech at the U.S. Naval Academy on May 22, 1998, President Clinton warned that our enemies "may deploy compact and relatively cheap weapons of mass destruction--not just nuclear, but also chemical or biological, to use disease as a weapon of war. Sometimes the terrorists and criminals act alone. But increasingly, they are interconnected, and sometimes supported by hostile countries." Hostile countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan.
Although Osama bin Laden left Sudan in 1996, many al Qaeda operatives stayed behind. According to testimony from several al Qaeda terrorists now in U.S. custody, al Qaeda operatives worked closely with Sudanese intelligence. Sudanese intelligence provided security for al Qaeda camps and safehouses. These agents intervened when local Sudanese authorities arrested al Qaeda members for exploding bombs at an al Qaeda farm, securing the release of the detained terrorists. Jamal al Fadl, an al Qaeda terrorist who later cooperated with U.S. prosecutors, testified that he was ordered by Sudanese intelligence to assassinate a political rival to Hassan al-Turabi. Even after bin Laden's departure, al Qaeda and Sudanese intelligence were virtually indistinguishable.
Shortly after Clinton's speech, the CIA produced an assessment of WMD proliferation that covered the first half of 1998. "Sudan," it said, "has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, Sudan obtained help from other countries, principally Iraq. Given its history in developing CW and its close relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well." CIA assessments through 2002 included similar analyses.
In July 1998, according to the 9/11 Commission report, "an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with bin Laden." Referring to the March and July meetings between Iraq and al Qaeda, the Commission noted that "sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through bin Laden's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis." In a maddening omission, the report does not elaborate on the "ties" between al Qaeda's No. 2 and the Iraqi regime.
Trouble was clearly brewing. On July 29, the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) warned of "possible Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) attack by UBL [Osama bin Laden]." But when the attack came, it was by conventional means: On August 7, al Qaeda terrorists struck the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224--including 12 Americans--and injuring more than 4,000. Almost immediately, the CIA assigned responsibility to terrorists affiliated with Osama bin Laden.
The U.S. response came two weeks later, on August 20, striking two targets. The first of these, al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, was uncontroversial. The second target--the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan--almost immediately gave rise to great controversy.
In justifying the strike on al Shifa, the Clinton administration pointed to several pieces of evidence: a soil sample indicating the presence of a precursor for VX nerve gas of Iraqi provenance; the presence of Iraqi chemical weapons experts at the plant; the long history of Iraq-Sudanese collaboration on chemical weapons; and telephone intercepts between senior Shifa officials and Emad Al Ani, the father of Iraq's chemical weapons program.
The press treated these claims with great skepticism. But Clinton administration officials and many intelligence analysts would continue to defend the intelligence surrounding al Shifa for years. In a January 23, 1999, article in the Washington Post, National Security Council counterterrorism director Richard Clarke defended the president's choice of target and said that "intelligence exists linking bin Laden to al Shifa's current and past operators, the Iraqi nerve gas experts and the National Islamic Front in Sudan." In an email he sent on November 4, 1998, to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, Clarke concluded that the presence of Iraqi chemical experts in Sudan was "probably a direct result of the Iraq-Al Qaeda agreement."
President Clinton's secretary of defense, William Cohen, continued to defend the decision to strike al Shifa before the 9/11 Commission last year. Cohen explained that there were "multiple, reinforcing elements of information ranging from links that the organization that built the facility [al Shifa] had both with bin Laden and with the leadership of the Iraqi chemical weapons program."
In an interview with THE WEEKLY STANDARD last fall, 9/11 Commission co-chairman Thomas Kean said: "Top officials--Bill Clinton, Sandy Berger, and others--told us with absolute certainty that there were chemical weapons of mass destruction at that factory, and that's why we sent missiles." Kean added: "We still can't say for certain that the chemicals were there. If they're right and there was stuff there, then it had to come from Iraq. They're the ones who had the stuff, who had this technology."
In fact, the Iraqis were openly involved with the al Shifa facility. Sudanese foreign minister Osman Ismail was in Baghdad when the plant was attacked. He told reporters the facility was nothing more than a pharmaceutical factory. As proof he pointed to the existence of a contract awarded to al Shifa through the U.N. Oil-for-Food program. But the contract raised questions even then. In the eight months between the signing of the $199,000 contract and the U.S. strikes on al Shifa, no goods were delivered. With the benefit of hindsight, we now understand that Saddam Hussein manipulated the Oil-for-Food program to reward friends and business partners willing to help him circumvent U.N. sanctions and rebuild his weapons programs. U.S. counterterrorism officials tell The Weekly Standard that relatively few Oil-for-Food contracts went to Sudanese companies, and that the contract with al Shifa stands out as troubling.
There was reporting about an Iraqi presence at a number of facilities in Sudan. The Clinton administration chose al Shifa for destruction largely because it was outside of Khartoum and was thus unlikely to result in a large number of casualties. There were several other potential targets. "The consistent stream of intelligence at that time said it wasn't just al Shifa," says John Gannon, who was chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the time. "There were three different [chemical weapons] structures in the Sudan. There was the hiring of Iraqis. There was no question that the Iraqis were there."
As for the August 1998 Iraq-al Qaeda plots against the U.S. and British embassies in Pakistan, revealed in the Guantanamo Summary of Evidence obtained by the AP, we are left with more questions than answers. Has the detainee's story been corroborated? Were the attacks in Pakistan what the CIA's counterterrorism center warned about on July 29? Were they to have been carried out in tandem with the August 7, 1998, al Qaeda embassy bombings? Were they intended as a rejoinder to the U.S. strikes on al Shifa? A Pentagon spokesman says the government's policy against discussing detainees prevents him from providing any answers. Other Bush administration and intelligence officials contacted by The Weekly Standard either did not know about the detainee or refused to discuss the case.
On August 27, 1998, Iraq's Babel newspaper, published by Uday Hussein, labeled Osama bin Laden an "Arab and Islamic hero."
* * *
"Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden have sealed a pact."
Milan's Corriere della Sera, December 28, 1998, as cited in the Senate Intelligence Committee report, p. 328
SADDAM HUSSEIN continued to defy U.N. weapons inspectors throughout the fall of 1998. Noncompliance was the norm. Confrontations about access to suspected WMD sites became almost a daily occurrence.
Back in Washington, members of both parties urged President Clinton to increase the pressure on Iraq. Congress was considering legislation that would make "regime change" in Iraq official U.S. policy. The United States also began broadcasting anti-Hussein messages into Iraq via Radio Free Iraq. The broadcasts were housed in the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Prague. The first broadcast went out on October 30, 1998. The Iraqis were furious and threatened retaliation. On November 8, 1998, a commentator on Iraqi state television insisted the broadcasts would do nothing to affect the "jihad spirit" of the Iraqis. A statement three days later from Saddam's Baath party called on Muslims to be steadfast in the ongoing Mother of All Battles and to undertake "unprecedented heroisms" to fight the Zionists and Crusaders. And then, a call for attacks:
All living capabilities of the Arab nation should be toward the unity of the pan-Arab [world] and toward escalating the struggle to the highest levels of jihad. . . . The escalation of the confrontation and the disclosure of its dimensions and the aggressive intentions now require an organized, planned, influential and conclusive enthusiasm against U.S. interests.
This was not, apparently, just bluster. The Iraqi regime wired $150,000 to an account in Prague, according to Jabir Salim, the man on the receiving end. Salim was the Iraqi station chief in the Czech Republic and with the money he received an order: Recruit a young Islamic radical to blow up the headquarters of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Salim had difficulty finding someone to commit the martyrdom operation, he told British Intelligence after defecting to the West when the U.S. launched Operation Desert Fox--a series of cruise missile attacks on Iraqi targets--on December 16, 1998. Salim also told interrogators that the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship had intensified after the August 1998 embassy bombings and that the Iraqi Intelligence station in Pakistan served as the hub of Iraq-al Qaeda activity.
Operation Desert Fox would last four days. Saddam Hussein's response was revealing. On December 21, he dispatched one of his most trusted intelligence operatives, Faruq Hijazi, to Afghanistan to meet bin Laden. Hijazi had met with both Zawahiri and bin Laden on many occasions earlier in the decade. On December 26, Osama bin Laden condemned the U.S.-led attacks. "The British and the American people loudly declared their support for their leaders' decision to attack Iraq," bin Laden proclaimed. He added that this support made it the "duty of Muslims to confront, fight and kill" British and American citizens.
The meeting between bin Laden and Hijazi instigated a burst of intelligence reporting on Iraq and al Qaeda. One source reported that "the Iraqi regime was trying to broaden its cooperation with al Qaeda. Iraq was looking to recruit Muslim 'elements' to sabotage U.S. and U.K. interests."
These claims were not limited to sensitive intelligence reporting. In the weeks that followed the meeting, dozens of press outlets from around the world reported on it as well as several others. The reports indicated that Saddam had offered bin Laden safe haven, had already trained al Qaeda operatives, and was supporting bin Laden's efforts to attack Western targets.
The details reported were striking. On December 28 Milan's Corriere della Sera reported "Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden have sealed a pact." In its issue dated January 11, 1999, Newsweek quoted an anonymous "Arab intelligence officer who knows Saddam personally" as warning that "very soon you will be witnessing large-scale terrorist activity run by the Iraqis" against Western targets. The Iraqi plan would be run under one of three "false flags": Palestinian, Iranian, and the "al Qaeda apparatus." All of these groups, Newsweek reported, had representatives in Baghdad.
The reports did not end there. Throughout February and March 1999, there was media speculation that bin Laden would relocate from Afghanistan to Iraq. Behind the scenes, Clinton administration officials were engaging in similar conjecture. According to the 9/11 Commission report, Richard Clarke sent an email to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger on February 11, 1999. Clarke told Berger that if bin Laden learned of U.S. operations against him, "old wily Osama will likely boogie to Baghdad." Days later Bruce Riedel of the National Security Council staff also emailed Berger, warning that "Saddam Hussein wanted bin Laden in Baghdad." Reports of Iraqi offers of safe haven, cooperation, and training continued throughout 1999.
* * *
"The Shakir in Kuala Lumpur has many interesting connections that are so multiple in their intersections with al Qaeda-related organizations and people as to suggest something more than random chance."
9/11 Commissioner John Lehman, July 22, 2004
TWO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES believe that Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national who escorted a September 11 hijacker to the key planning meeting for those attacks in Kuala Lumpur, was working for Iraqi Intelligence: the Malaysians, who monitored Shakir's activities as he facilitated the travel for 9/11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar in January 2000, and the Jordanians, who detained Shakir for three months after the September 11 attacks.
Shakir began working as a VIP greeter for Malaysian Airlines in August 1999. He told associates he had gotten the job through a contact at the Iraqi embassy named Ra'ad al-Mudaris. In fact, al-Mudaris controlled Shakir's schedule--telling him when to report to work and when to take a day off. The Senate Intelligence Committee report reveals that "another source claimed that Mudaris was a former IIS officer."
Al-Mudaris apparently told Shakir to report to work on January 5, 2000, the same day September 11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar arrived in Kuala Lumpur. Shakir escorted al Mihdhar to a waiting car and then, rather than bid his guest farewell, jumped in the car with him. U.S. intelligence officials will not say whether Shakir was an active participant in the meeting, but with photographs provided by Malaysian intelligence, there is little doubt he was there. The meeting lasted from January 5 to January 8. Shakir reported to work twice after the meeting broke up and then disappeared.
He was arrested in Doha, Qatar, on September 17, 2001. He had been employed by the Qatari government in its Ministry of Religious Development. Authorities found what Newsweek's Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman described as a "treasure trove": contact information--both on Shakir and back at his apartment--for several high-ranking al Qaeda terrorists. They include: Zaid Sheikh Mohammed, brother of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; Musab Yasin, brother of Abdul Rahman Yasin, the Iraqi who participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; Abu Hajer al Iraqi, the Iraqi national alleged to have been Osama bin Laden's "best friend"; and Ibrahim Suleiman, a Kuwaiti native whose fingerprints were found on the bombmaking manuals authorities say were used in preparation for the 1993 Trade Center bombing. We also know that in January 1993, shortly before the first attack on the World Trade Center, Shakir had received a phone call later traced to the New Jersey safehouse that served as the headquarters for that operation.
Despite this, the Qataris released Shakir. (The Qatari government has not responded to numerous interview requests.) But he was detained again on October 21, 2001, this time by Jordanians in Amman, where he was to have caught a flight to Baghdad. The Jordanians held him for three months. The Iraqi regime repeatedly contacted the Jordanian government and pressed for his release. The Jordanians, who had concluded that Shakir was working for Iraqi Intelligence, devised a plan and presented it to the CIA. The Jordanians proposed releasing Shakir, but only after extracting from him a promise to report back on the activities of Iraqi Intelligence from inside Iraq. Perhaps mindful of the woeful lack of human sources in Iraq, the CIA approved. The Jordanians set him free in late January 2002, at which point he returned to Baghdad.
He was never heard from again.
The Weekly Standard asked 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman about Shakir last year, shortly after the commission's final report was released. "The Shakir in Kuala Lumpur has many interesting connections that are so multiple in their intersections with al Qaeda-related organizations and people as to suggest something more than random chance," he said. We clarified: "With respect to both al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime?"
"Yes. Both."
* * *
"Following the expulsion of al Qaeda from Afghanistan and their arrival in northern Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi (a senior al Qaeda figure) was relatively free to travel within Iraq proper and to stay in Baghdad for some time. Several of his colleagues visited him there."
The Butler Report, July 14, 2004
TEN DAYS BEFORE September 11, 2001, a small group of Islamic radicals came together in the northern, Kurdish-controlled area of Iraq. They would quickly come to be known as Ansar al Islam. Their ranks swelled as hundreds of al Qaeda terrorists fled the U.S. assault on the Taliban in Afghanistan. It quickly became clear to many policymakers and intelligence analysts that the Ansar camps were fallback zones for al Qaeda.
In time, one of Ansar's leaders would become the face of not only the Iraqi insurgency, but also of al Qaeda. Abu Musab al Zarqawi is, besides Osama bin Laden, perhaps the best known al Qaeda terrorist on the planet. He and his followers have been linked to terrorist plots the world over: from a plot in Jordan at the turn of the millennium, to the assassination of U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley in October 2002, to the Madrid train bombing on March 11, 2004. His personal role in the beheadings of hostages in Iraq has provided a stark reminder of the brutality of the jihadists.
As the war in Iraq approached, the Bush administration cited Zarqawi's presence in Baghdad from May to July 2002--allegedly, for medical treatment--as evidence that Saddam harbored and aided al Qaeda terrorists. This claim was met with a remarkable degree of skepticism.
Prior to September 11, there was nary a mention of Zarqawi. It appears that the intelligence community did not pay much attention to him until after 9/11, when, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee report, "an ongoing collection" became "aggressively worked." Thus, there is much uncertainty concerning his origins and exactly when his relationship with Saddam's regime began.
Recently, Ayad Allawi, the first post-Saddam prime minister of Iraq, stated that Iraqi intelligence documents show that Zarqawi was in Saddam-controlled parts of Iraq in late 1999. The documents, according to Allawi, also show that Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells with the full knowledge of Saddam's intelligence services. If the documents are authentic, and we cannot offer a judgment one way or another, then they will put to rest any doubts about Zarqawi's involvement with Saddam's regime prior to the war.
There were many early reports that Iraqi intelligence officers were among Ansar's leadership and thus Zarqawi's cohorts. One of these was a man known by his nom de guerre, Abu Wael. Ansar's Kurdish enemies, and several IIS and al Qaeda detainees, claimed from the beginning that Abu Wael was an Iraqi Intelligence officer who managed the relationship between Ansar and Saddam's regime. The Kurds have also repeatedly claimed that he, as well as other IIS officers, supplied Ansar with funding and arms.
The case of Abu Wael remains unresolved, but the Kurds' claims that the Iraqi regime provided al Qaeda members with weapons and funding has been validated by other intelligence reporting. A May 2002 signals intelligence report, included in the Feith memo, stated that "an Iraqi intelligence official, praising Ansar al Islam, provided it with $100,000 and agreed to continue to give assistance." Another report from the National Security Agency in October 2002 said that "al Qaeda and Iraq reached a secret agreement whereby Iraq would provide safe haven to al Qaeda members and provide them with money and weapons." It was this agreement that "reportedly prompted a large number of al Qaeda members to head to Iraq."
In addition to Saddam's support for al Qaeda in Kurdish-controlled territories, we also know that Zarqawi was not alone in Baghdad. According to the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Report, the CIA "described a network of more than a dozen al Qaeda or al Qaeda-associated operatives in Baghdad" before the war.
The intelligence community has downplayed the possibility that the Iraqi regime supported Zarqawi's prewar activities, including the assassination of Laurence Foley. Intelligence community analysts, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee report, point out that "neither of the two suspects" in the shooting "provided any information on links between al-Zarqawi and the Iraqi regime."
But we also have testimony from one of the suspects in the murder that Zarqawi "directed and financed the operations of the cell" responsible "before, during and after his stint in Baghdad between May and July 2002." And both of the suspects have said that "one member of the al Zarqawi network traveled repeatedly between regime-controlled Iraq and Syria after March 2002."
Thus, many in the intelligence community implausibly assume that Zarqawi could have planned terrorist attacks from neo-Stalinist Baghdad and had one of his operatives travel in and out of Iraqi regime-controlled territory without Saddam's approval. The next question is obvious: If it is so easy for regime foes to maintain a long-term presence in Baghdad and to transit in and out of Iraq, why was it so difficult for the CIA to operate there? This assumption flies in the face of everything we know about Saddam and his control over Iraq.
* * *
"The CIA had no [redacted] credible reporting on the leadership of either the Iraqi regime or al Qaeda, which would have enabled it to better define a cooperative relationship, if any did in fact exist. As a result, the CIA refrained from asserting that Iraq and al Qaeda had cooperated on terrorist attacks."
Senate Intelligence Committee report, July 7, 2004
THE CONCLUSION of the Senate Intelligence Committee report--that the CIA did not have the type of intelligence reporting that "would have enabled it to better define a cooperative relationship"--was ignored by the press. We now have reporting that demonstrates the nature of the relationship. One day there will be much more. At a large warehouse in Doha, Qatar, the Defense Intelligence Agency is reviewing millions of pages of documents from the former Iraqi regime. That process is painfully slow due to a lack of resources and a lack of interest in pursuing the full story of Iraqi support for terrorism.
That lack of interest is not new. As the anonymous intelligence analyst told the Senate Intelligence Committee: "I don't think we were really focused on the CT [counterterrorism] side, because we weren't concerned about the IIS going out and pro-actively conducting terrorist attacks." That the intelligence community did not pay particular attention to Saddam Hussein's terrorist aspirations created a sizable blind spot.
Why wouldn't Saddam Hussein conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. interests? The United States regularly bombed targets in Iraq--at times almost daily--in support of the no-fly zones. We conducted more significant attacks in January and June 1993, and again in 1996 and 1998. The CIA attempted to foment a coup in 1996. The U.N. sanctions sought to deprive Saddam of the resources he needed to sustain a robust military. The weapons inspections occupied his top officials and hundreds of intelligence officers. From 1998 forward, after the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, the official policy of the United States was to end his regime. With that policy came support of Iraqi opposition groups who existed to remove him from power. For Saddam, then, the Gulf war never ended. He routinely accused the United States of "terrorism" and "genocide." The state-run Iraqi media threatened to exact revenge for more than a decade.
Further, Saddam had proven his willingness to use asymmetric means of retaliation time and again. He attempted to use his own intelligence service and terrorist surrogates against the United States during the first Gulf war. He assisted a fugitive from the 1993 World Trade Center attacks. He attempted to assassinate George H.W. Bush. He sought to blow up the U.S. government's Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters. He openly supported terrorist activity in the region. "From 1996 to 2003," according to the Senate Intelligence Committee report, "the IIS focused its terrorist activities on western interests, particularly against the U.S. and Israel."
We know that in the context of a decade-long confrontation with the United States, Saddam reached out to al Qaeda on numerous occasions. We know that the leadership of al Qaeda reciprocated, requesting assistance in its endeavors. We know that reports of meetings, offers of safe haven, and collaboration persisted.
What we do not know is the full extent of the relationship. But we know enough to know that there was one. And we know enough to know it was a threat.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 13:10 ||
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#1
People who peddle the "no connection" meme are willfully prevaricating. Is this article shows, there is plenty of evidince to indicate a connection.
I am having this argument with my brother right now and this is most timely ammunition.
Thanks
Posted by: DanNY ||
07/09/2005 13:44 Comments ||
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#3
Well, yeah, but we didn't know it beforehand, so there was no justification, so Bush lied and the war is all for nought and besides, he let bin Laden get away, and ... oh, well. You know the rest.
Besides, this is waayyy too long for anyone in the media to boil down into a sound bite!
Posted by: Bobby ||
07/09/2005 14:26 Comments ||
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#4
No, no this can't be...the intelligence community will not accept this because they have (not collected) any good intelligence on this "connection."
Signed,
Group Think
Posted by: Captain America ||
07/09/2005 16:00 Comments ||
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#7
"In August 1998, the detainee traveled to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi Intelligence for the purpose of blowing up the Pakistan, United States and British embassies with chemical mortars."
Bobby: Besides, this is waayyy too long for anyone in the media to boil down into a sound bite!
I'd think a rational person would need only that 1st sentence. It is a doozy!
Turban Durban, Scarry Kerry, and most of all Filobuster Bagogas Kennedy....
#8
As follows on from the "blood feud" article from the other day 98% of the United States population will not read let alone wrap their mind around this knoweledge. All we can do is offer it. The MSM will never condense it because it goes against their seditionist movement and ideas.
Posted by: Frank G ||
07/09/2005 19:07 Comments ||
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#12
It makes me wonder sometimes just what would constitute proof to the the Dems and their steno pool, the MSM. Maybe a memo with bin Laden's and Saddam's fingerprints on it:
August 11, 2001
Palace #58
Baghdad, Iraq
Dear Sammy,
Hey, that deal with the planes sounds great! I say we go for it!
Saddam
It still wouldn't be enough.
Posted by: Darth VAda ||
07/09/2005 21:46 Comments ||
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The bodies of a Buddhist couple were found shot and nearly decapitated on Friday in restive southern Thailand, adding to the five other beheadings in the past three weeks, police said.
Jad Suwanchatree, 52, a defence volunteer in Muang district of Yala province, and his wife Serm, 51, were riding their motorcycle to tap rubber from a plantation when they were killed.
"As Jad stopped his motorcycle to remove wood which blocked the road, he was shot and slashed in his neck, as was his wife," police in Yala said.
"Their heads were not totally separated from their bodies" although a doctor confirmed the cause of death for both was their neck injuries, police added.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 00:15 ||
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Killing Buddhists, jeez. I know it's not logical, but that seems depraved even beyond the regular depravity of chopping off people's heads. Is there anyplace on the planet, other than Dearborn, where large groups of Muslims actually get along with their neighbors?
One of the country's top clerics, Ayatollah Mohammed Emami-Kashani, said they were the direct result of the UK's support for US and Israeli policies.
The ayatollah called al-Qaeda an "illegitimate child" of the West. The Friday prayer leader said it was divine justice that a group which had nothing to do with Islam had now conspired against its backers.
The BBC's Frances Harrison in Tehran says Iran's view is that US funding for extremist Sunni Muslim groups opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s set the stage for the emergence of the Taleban and al-Qaeda.
A commentary on Iranian state radio, meanwhile, blamed the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, for the attacks. This savagery is not Islam - it is coming from inside of you and it is now punching you.
Poltergeist??
It said Mossad was the only group capable of carrying out such operations in London and had often tried to attract attention to its opponents during G8 meetings in the past.
Posted by: Captain America ||
07/09/2005 03:21 ||
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This charge was predictable, lol. What no Zionist Death Ray machine was available?
#2
Iran's view is that US funding for extremist Sunni Muslim groups opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s set the stage for the emergence of the Taleban and al-Qaeda.
Seems like the MMs have been reading the NY Times again.
#5
Tom Friedman is right. change will have to come from muslims themselves. and as long as so-called "moderate" muslims allow this tripe to spew, they will remain ignorant and marginalized.
#6
The answer isn't going to come from the muzzies themselves. I think the answer will eventually be supplied by several Annapolis grads who are currently junior officers on Ohios.
#7
This is totally predictable considering the Shiite/Sunni schism within Islam, Iran's fixation with Israel, and the Islamic propensity toward self-contradiction ("al-Qaeda did it"...no, wait... "the Mossad did it").
"This savagery is not Islam"
Right, neither are your centrifuges.
Qom -- third holiest crater in Islam.
Posted by: Neutron Tom ||
07/09/2005 10:54 Comments ||
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#8
From your lips, Neutron Tom and Shipman, to the appropriate ears.
#13
HHHHHHHhhhhhhhhhhhhhhmmmmmmm, so iff I understand the general Islamists' argument correctly they want America and the West to get out of Islamic/Muslim areas so that they the Islamists can get on with conquering the world, includ but not limited to America and the West, and establishing a Global Islamic State/Islamic OWG, and they are going to accomplish this mighty feat by creating a global ARMY OF ISLAM composed of many old geezer Generals and Imams but no young men = warriors as the latter are all being sent on suicide missions!? ALL HE HUM BIG [OLD]CHIEFS, FEW TO NO INDIANS, AND DA WIMIN - read, BEARERS OF FUTURE WARRIORS OF ISLAM AND ALLAH AND MOHAMMED - STILL GET REPRESSED ANDOR SLAUGHTERED AT A WHIM. THATS A MANUAL FOR PRAGMATIC CONQUEST AND MODERNITY IFF THERE EVER WAS ONE - WHERE CAN WEST POINT OR THE ROYAL MIL ACADEMY OF WONGA-PONGA, ETC. GET A COPY!
The Department of Energy is turning to old Star Trek phasers to protect its 103 civilian nuclear plants.
Energy weapons capable of harmlessly stunning intruders are being developed and should be in general use by 2008. The heck you say! Fry the buggers! But many experts warn they will be inadequate and unnecessary for the real security dangers nuclear plant guards would face.
Heh, maybe we can turn up the frequency on these buggers!
#2
Super-soakers filled with soft lard may be equally effective.
Posted by: Neutron Tom ||
07/09/2005 16:48 Comments ||
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Sawed-off 12-gauge double-barrel with bird shot. Won't kill anybody unless they're on top of you, but you'll know who they are. The pattern is distinctive. Kinda hard to miss the target with them, too.
Posted by: Old Patriot ||
07/09/2005 21:40 Comments ||
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What about ye olde Airsoft Guns filled with Capsican pellets?
Posted by: Phil Fraering ||
07/09/2005 22:48 Comments ||
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Mustafa Setmarian Nasar has been called the mastermind behind last year's Madrid bombings when 10 bombs exploded on four commuter trains killing almost 200 people.
He is still at large and was widely believed to have been planning an attack on Britain, reported the Daily Mirror.
But did he really carry out his plan in London on Thursday?
He is a man who sets up sleeper cells then leaves his recruits to do their worst. He also teaches them forgery techniques so they can fake identity papers.
The paper reported two of his key players, both North African, had UK passports in the names of Frost and Burgess to make travel easier.
Mustafa, who has a pale complexion, red hair and green eyes, often uses a fake British ID. He lived in North London in the mid-1990s and has been in close contact with two suspects in Belmarsh prison in South East London.
Mustafa, who has a US$5million ($8.5m) US Government bounty on his head, ordered the Madrid bombers to blow themselves up after they were cornered by police.
MSNBC reported that Mustafa is wanted because of his contacts and influence, not because he directs terrorist operations.
A native Syrian with a Spanish passport, he was quietly placed on the State Department's 'Rewards for Justice' list last month.
'He is a pen jihadist, a propagandist,' said one US official.
'He is all pen, no action, but the man has amazing access to a lot of other key players.'
Among those he has had contact with is Osama Bin Laden, who met him in Sudan during the early 1990's.
Mustafa taught at and ran training camps in Afghanistan and had contact with Osama and other top Al-Qaeda leaders there as well.
Mustafa married a Spanish woman, Elena Moreno, with whom he has two children. He himself looks very little like the typical Arab.
In September 2003, he was among 35 people named in an indictment handed down by Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzon for terrorist activities.
The magistrate said Mustafa gave terrorism training, particularly in the development and use of poisons, to individuals from Spain, Italy and France, then sent them home as 'sleepers' awaiting orders.
His whereabouts are unknown, but some in the US intelligence community believe he is in Iraq.
One of his closest aides, Amer Azizi, met Mohammad Atta, leader of the 9/11 hijackers, and his friend, Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, the organiser of the 9-11 hijack teams, in Tarragona, Spain two months before the attacks.
Azizi is also believed to have activated the cell that planted bombs on Spanish trains and at train stations. Mustafa's role remains murky, say officials.
Much of what is known about him comes from interrogations of Al-Qaeda militants in US custody, in particular Bin Al Shibh.
Mustafa is famous among radicals for his book, The Syrian Experiment, a call to action against the repressive Arab nationalist regime of the Asad family. As a journalist, he has often written under the pseudonym, Abu Musab Suri.
'He is a lover of books more than bombs and his organisational skills leave a lot to be desired,' said one official, who dismissed reports that Mustafa is the ideological and religious advisor to Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, the Jordanian militant whose organisation has taken responsibility for many of the terrorist attacks in Iraq.
'He doesn't get along with Zarqawi,' said the official, declining to provide more details. 'He is not a spiritual leader for Zarqawi.'
The Times Online had reported in March that Mustafa might have been planning an attack in Britain during the general election.
Documents found in a Madrid flat used by some of the bombers show how Mustafa ordered them to strike in the final days of the Spanish election campaign last March.
The coded command was sent three months earlier; Mustafa left it to his lieutenants in Spain to decide what the target should be.
The documents showed that the bombing on the eve of the election was to be followed by suicide attacks.
But the militant gang who were to stage these blew themselves up when cornered by police.
The CIA has had reported sightings of Mustafa in a dozen countries, including Britain, but the recent discovery of his Spanish wife and their children in Kuwait City led US agents to believe that he may be hiding in Iraq.
Investigators in Madrid are convinced that what they have uncovered in recent weeks shows how a British cell is likely to operate after Mustafa's tuition.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 13:32 ||
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Pakistan seems to have embarked on a new strategy to flush out militants sympathetic to Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network from its territory. The game plan involves letting loose dozens of suspects known to have been affiliated with or at least sympathetic to al-Qaeda, in the hope that they would eventually lead the authorities to some top wanted figures in the terrorist organisation. Top security experts admit that it is a dangerous game but argue that a similar approach in the past has reaped rich dividends. In particular, they point to Pakistan's northern tribal area of Waziristan - the inhospitable and semi-governed border between Pakistan and Afghanistan where a year-long confrontation with militants has cost the Pakistan army over 500 lives. Security experts say former Guantanamo detainees - released by the Pakistan authorities on being returned - unwittingly led security agencies to many previously unknown hideouts used by local and foreign militants in the area.
Similarly, say security officials, top al-Qaeda arrests in many parts of the country including Karachi were possible because of the released suspects who had led the authorities to their mentors. Pakistani authorities have now clearly decided to extend this strategy on a scale that some feel could lead to unexpected results. The visible part of the plan unfolding in recent weeks came in the shape of the release of about 150 Pakistanis who had returned from Guantanamo Bay. After extensive debriefing lasting between nine to 10 months, most of these men were allowed to go free. Pakistani officials say those released will remain subject to strict security protocols first drawn up when Pakistan opted to throw in its lot with the US after the 11 September attacks in the United States. But what Pakistani officials are unlikely to admit as openly is the fact that most of these individuals will also be under constant watch using the hi-tech surveillance equipment deployed in Pakistan by the US.
Top security experts admit that it is a dangerous game. There are also reports that at least two such organisations - Harkatul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammed - have restarted training camps in the district of Mansehra in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)⊠Some security analysts in Pakistan have been critical of the government's seemingly soft stance in relation to Harkat and Jaish - wondering why they have not been dealt with as severely as some of the other groups⊠The latest example of the government's soft approach was the release two weeks ago of Harkat chief Fazlur Rehman Khalili. He was first detained in September last year, released for a short while, but eventually placed under house arrest. Mr Khalili has now been released again - perhaps as part of a "network of human probes" that the authorities are hoping may lead them to top al-Qaeda leadership. Pakistani security officials privately admit that the plan is fraught with the danger of a resurgence of terror attacks inside Pakistan. But as one official put it, it may well be a small price to pay if it leads to the eventual capture of the world's most wanted man.
Posted by: Paul Moloney ||
07/09/2005 02:39 ||
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Pssstt: Don't tell anyone, okay?
Posted by: Captain America ||
07/09/2005 3:09 Comments ||
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#2
Perhaps this is the first oblique confirmation of the NEIN (Homelandsecurityus.com) report from Thursday, that one of the bombers -- possibly the one who boomed himself -- was a recent Gitmo release. Somebody just released the info now because there's a great many square inches of buttock to cover.
The Official Motto of the Pakistan Army is "Jihad and Piety in the name of Allah"
Using jihadists to hunt other jihadists?
And we wonder why the Paks can't find Osama?
"Terror struck into the hearts of the enemy is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved... Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him.â
-Brigadier General S.K. Malik The Quranic Concept of War
Foreword by General Zia-ul-Haq
1979, Wajid Aliâs Limited, Lahore, Pakistan
Posted by: john ||
07/09/2005 8:21 Comments ||
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#4
I'm sure glad that they're keeping this on the down-low.
#9
fine - if they're caught attacking Afghanistan or our troops there, consider it an act of war
Posted by: Frank G ||
07/09/2005 19:07 Comments ||
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#10
Were they considerate of the ROW enough to RFID tag these guys with some injected tags? (like right in their balls so they have to think before removing the tag.)
U.S. and Iraqi forces have "mostly eliminated" the ability of insurgents to conduct sustained, high-intensity attacks in Baghdad (search), the top U.S. commander in the Iraqi capital said Friday.
Maj. Gen. William G. Webster Jr. (search) said in a video-teleconference interview from Baghdad with reporters at the Pentagon that offensive operations by U.S. and Iraqi troops in recent weeks had sharply reduced the number of insurgent bombings. But he cautioned against concluding that the insurgency has been broken.
"It's very difficult to know it's over," Webster said.
There were 14 to 21 car bombings per week in Baghdad before the May 22 start of the U.S. portion of the latest offensive, dubbed Operation Lightning (search), he said. That has dropped to about seven or eight a week now, Webster said, attributing the improvement to the disruption of insurgent cells and the availability of more and better intelligence.
"There are some more threats ahead," he said. "I do believe, however, that the ability of these insurgents to conduct sustained, high-intensity operations as they did last year, we've mostly eliminated that."
He said that about 1,700 suspected insurgents had been captured during Operation Lightning, including 51 foreigners.
Despite those gains, Webster said the future course of the insurgency was uncertain.
"When you're talking about an insurgency in a country like this where the borders are still rather porous and folks can still come in and there is money available to hire local criminals and others to participate in the fight, it is very difficult to get a day-to-day estimate of the number of people you're fighting," he said.
On the other hand, he predicted that, "in the next couple of months we will not see sustained, long bloody months in Baghdad."
Webster painted a remarkably positive picture of the prospects for improving security in Baghdad. By October, when Iraqis are scheduled to vote on a new constitution, there should be a full division of Iraqi army soldiers, numbering about 18,000, sufficiently trained to take the lead in securing the Iraqi capital, he said.
There are now about 15,000 Iraqi soldiers, in various stages of training, in the Baghdad area that Webster commands. Of those, about one-third are sufficiently trained to control territory in the capital city, he said.
Webster's force, led by the 3rd Infantry Division, consists of about 30,000 troops â all but 1,000 of which are Americans. The non-U.S. troops are from Macedonia, Estonia and the former Soviet republic of Georgia.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 00:23 ||
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#1
I didn't bother to check, but this is presumably a wire-service dispatch. Thus the "remarkably positive picture" crack. It's only "remarkably positive" if you don't understand military affairs, haven't been paying attention, tend to view things through a wildly distorted prism, and and aren't too sharp to begin with. Things have been markedly better for some time, at least WRT to car bombs. Vest bombs, however, are up sharply -- more good news, though the media would never stumble across that bit of common sense. The idiots are going to vest bombs (far less powerful, and easier to defense in most situations) because they HAVE TO. But when the vest bomb trend finally hits the headlines, it will be marketed as the latest impressive innovation of an "adaptive, sophisticated" enemy, not the latest desperate change in tactics by a force that has lost the initiative.
I should know, I am an infantryman assigned to one of his subordinate units. Webster is a typical officer/politician, not at all interested in winning a war, just interested in not losing it while his unit is on the clock. Bombing in Baghdad has been cyclical for the last couple of years. It hits high points around key religious holidays and historical events, and then cools off. He should know this, but he's too busy sitting on his fat ass up in Camp Victory, congratulating himself on what a fine job he's done and speculating on what higher command he's now entitled to.
Furthermore, the insurgency consists of various groups with conflicting aims. The domestic insurgents seem to be quiescent at present, true, but recently there was a spectacularly successful series of VBIED attacks perpetrated by a group of Syrian fighters. Syrians, Iranians, Somalis, Palestinians, we've got ourselves a proper witches' brew boiling here. This rant isn't to say that we can't win, or that given time we won't win. What my point is is that we won't win as long as useless placesitters, spineless politicians, and weaseley lawyers pretending to be senior officers are in charge. This Army has lots of warriors. Good, honorable, hard working warriors. Men who would rather be out in the fight than behind the walls of our FOBs. But like every Socialist boondoggle, the Army is run by careerist weasels who don't give a fiddler's fart if American soldiers die, just as long as it doesn't affect their next OER. And though they would never pick up a rifle or a shovel they will do yeoman's work in protecting their precious fiefdoms and their mediocracies from better men.
Resign your commission and leave my Army you piece of crap.
Posted by: Simple Simon ||
07/09/2005 3:16 Comments ||
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#3
Thanks Verlaine, been enjoying your comments for a while now. Is your job in the Zone independant from the 1 year rotation?
Simple Simon, Thanks for being there. please come back and tell us more.
Posted by: Red Dog ||
07/09/2005 3:29 Comments ||
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#4
I'm a REMF at the Palace in the IZ, a civilian (also on a one-year stint, but thinking of extending through the elections in Dec/Jan).
What Simon says here tracks with a lot of scattered anecdotal data I've been hearing for over a year from various (all Army) types. Not the vitriol directed at senior brass (which I can't dispute from my perspective), but specific complaints about a lack of aggressiveness and seriousness in dealing with the enemy. It's the best military the world has ever seen, but it's not neccessarily being applied in the most effective manner.
As to the "success" of any sort of terrorist attack here, I wonder whether that term means much apart from actual impact on the political process. If 10 car bombs kill X number of grandmothers and police recruits in a 2 week period, and the next day the TNA reports out a constitution with reasonable support from Kurd, Shi'a, and establishment Sunni leadership -- what was the significance of the car bombs?
I'm tempted to say that the car bombs are exactly like the huge number of "successful" kamikaze hits on US Navy ships off Okinawa -- lots of blood and ships sunk/damaged, zero impact on the outcome of the operation.
Much like the WWII kamikazes, the "insurgents" here are probably only affecting the cost and timetable of their defeat here -- not averting the defeat itself.
#5
Feather merchants have been the Bane of militaries since at least as far back as the Roman Empire.As dispicable as they are they seem to be a fact of military life.
#6
kind of goes along with zawkawi's rant that he 's having trouble finding male splodeydopes--and his spiritual-spit-leader's advice to him to take the jihad elseware--something's happening here--even if the c.o is a doofus--he'd be an idiot to spout this positive spin unless he knew something's up--btw the red on red stuff and the change in the "list" voting procedures so that sunnis get a piece of the pie are very telling--the wind up will be confused process not a ceremony on the u.s.s. missouri
Posted by: SON OF TOLUI ||
07/09/2005 12:01 Comments ||
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A purported Al-Qaida affiliate group calling itself the "Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades - European Division" has claimed responsibility for the "blessed battle of London" in a statement published on an Internet website. According to the statement:
"Several of the mujahideen from the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades have launched successive attacks in the capital of tyranny, the British capital... we declare that the coming days will bear witness to legendary stories of the battle against those who have declared war on Islam and the Muslims, and we will not relent nor we will submit until there is real and true security for the Islamic nation and for Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine. The beginning was in Madrid and Istanbul, and today [it was] in London."
As with similar alleged communiques recently issued over the Internet claiming responsibility for the terrorist bombings in London, there is no way to verify its authenticity. The Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades have issued numerous other would-be statements on Internet websites over the past two years, including a claim of responsibility for the 3/11 attacks in Madrid, Spain.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
07/09/2005 00:22 ||
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"blessed battle of London"
Yes, make this look like WW3. We all know what happened to the UK's enemy in the previous World War.
Posted by: Charles ||
07/09/2005 1:06 Comments ||
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#2
only muslims can consider killing innocent, unwitting civilians a "battle"
wonder how they'd feel if innocent muslims were targeted (I mean REALLY targeted, not like muslims claim to be now)?
#3
...we declare that the coming days will bear witness to legendary stories of the battle...
legendary stories? "I bravely left the bag on the tube next to the two women!" battle? "I had to struggle against the flow of people joining the tube so I could get off - I almost lost my shoe!"
I think we've heard this shite before!
Arsehole.
Posted by: Tony (UK) ||
07/09/2005 11:36 Comments ||
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#4
even a three year old western child has more conscience and common sense
Posted by: SON OF TOLUI ||
07/09/2005 12:15 Comments ||
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JAMMU: Four Indian soldiers and four militants were killed in a gunfight on Friday near the Line of Control (LoC) in one of the region's biggest clashes in six months, an army officer said. The fighting began when Indian troops spotted the militants crossing the LoC into a forest in Poonch district on Thursday. "Hundreds of rounds were fired in the gun-battle which lasted for over eight hours," the officer said.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/09/2005 00:00 ||
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Four Israeli soldiers were wounded Friday when a roadside bomb exploded in front of their jeep as they travelled in the southern Gaza Strip, military sources said. They were taken to hospital with light injuries after the bomb - detonated by a mobile telephone - exploded in their path near the Sufa crossing in south of the occupied Palestinian territory. The sources said it was the fifth such incident on Israeli troops in Gaza this week. In a telephone call to AFP, the militant Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which is loosely affiliated to Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas's ruling Fatah party, claimed responsibility for the attack.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/09/2005 00:00 ||
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If I were the Prime Minister of Israel, I could probably put an end to the "Infitada" in about six weeks. Every time there's an attack on Israeli troops, the rest of the troops would capture 160 acres of "Palestinian" territory, shoving out and destroying everything belonging to the Arabs, and taking control of the territory for all time. Either they quit attacking, or the new Israeli borders will be the Suez Canal, the Jordan River, and a line from the Med inward from just south of Beirut to Damascas. Then I'd fortify the hell out of the border and dare an ant to try to cross.
Posted by: Old Patriot ||
07/09/2005 21:30 Comments ||
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#2
I like it
Posted by: Frank G ||
07/09/2005 21:37 Comments ||
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#3
Movable siege walls from the middle ages... YES! A technique that fits the muslim era's mindset.
LAHORE: The Bomb Disposal Squad (BDS) officials and city police found and deactivated a bomb lying in front of Iqbal Sialvi's house, Pakistan People's Party Information Secretary, in the Shadbagh area. The police said that locals had called 15 and informed the authorities about the bomb. The BDS official and police vacated the area and deactivated the bomb. They said that the bomb was made locally and weighed 7 kilograms. Police said that the bomb was zinc-plated and some old metal trader, fearing the ongoing crackdown against sale and purchase of smuggled gunmetal, might have thrown the bomb on the road. The crackdown against the traders is to stop the sale and purchase of gunmetal that is smuggled from Afghanistan.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/09/2005 00:00 ||
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Al-Qaeda's wing in Iraq claimed it had killed Egypt's top envoy who was abducted by gunmen last weekend and warned it would go after "as many ambassadors as we can" to punish countries that support Iraq's U.S.-backed leadership.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/09/2005 00:00 ||
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#1
So full of hate these folks sigh....
Posted by: Jan ||
07/09/2005 0:11 Comments ||
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#2
hey, he was an "enemy of god"--whatcha expect
Posted by: SON OF TOLUI ||
07/09/2005 12:04 Comments ||
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Police have made a major breakthrough in the investigation of a senior military intelligence officer's assassination in Colombo as Tamil guerrillas continued to target police and army intelligence officers. Police have raided a safe-house in the outskirts of the capital and arrested four people including a woman connected with the assassination of Lieutenant Colonel T.N. Muthalif, one of the main officers involved in cracking down on Tamil guerrilla activities.
The suspects were produced in court yesterday and remanded after preliminary investigation revealed that guerrillas of the Liberation Tigers of Tamils Eelam (LTTE) were involved in the killing. Military academy An employee in a biscuit factory on the outskirts of Colombo, whom Tamil rebels had been promised two million Sri Lankan rupees (Dh73,400) to gather information about Muthalif's movements is among those arrested. The arrests were considered a major breakthrough as the Tigers usually carryout murders in the capital without leaving any clue. Muthalif was gunned down as he was being driven to a military academy in the outskirts of the capital on March 31.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/09/2005 00:00 ||
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A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
A Yemeni man named by Saudi Arabia last month as one of its most wanted militant suspects has been in detention in Yemen under another name, the Saudi Interior Ministry said on Saturday. It said 
A judge on Friday convicted and sentenced to life in prison three members of the Red Brigades terrorist group for the 1999 killing of a government labor adviser, court officials said. A fourth was convicted and sentenced to nine years. Prosecutors had asked for life terms for all four, who were accused of gunning down Massimo D'Antona in Rome in May 1999 while he was working on labor market reforms that were bitterly contested by Italy's labor unions. Sentenced to life terms were Nadia Desdemona Lioce, Marco Mezzasalma and Roberto Morandi. Paolo Broccatelli received a nine-year term. There was no explanation for the ruling; Italian judges provide written explanations of their verdicts several weeks after they are issued. Several other defendants on trial were given lesser sentences.
JAMMU: Four Indian soldiers and four militants were killed in a gunfight on Friday near the Line of Control (LoC) in one of the region's biggest clashes in six months, an army officer said. The fighting began when Indian troops spotted the militants crossing the LoC into a forest in Poonch district on Thursday. "Hundreds of rounds were fired in the gun-battle which lasted for over eight hours," the officer said.
Four Israeli soldiers were wounded Friday when a roadside bomb exploded in front of their jeep as they travelled in the southern Gaza Strip, military sources said. They were taken to hospital with light injuries after the bomb - detonated by a mobile telephone - exploded in their path near the Sufa crossing in south of the occupied Palestinian territory. The sources said it was the fifth such incident on Israeli troops in Gaza this week. In a telephone call to AFP, the militant Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which is loosely affiliated to Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas's ruling Fatah party, claimed responsibility for the attack.
Police have made a major breakthrough in the investigation of a senior military intelligence officer's assassination in Colombo as Tamil guerrillas continued to target police and army intelligence officers. Police have raided a safe-house in the outskirts of the capital and arrested four people including a woman connected with the assassination of Lieutenant Colonel T.N. Muthalif, one of the main officers involved in cracking down on Tamil guerrilla activities.
